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No. 70-45 -- U.S. v. Brewster
(WORK DRAFT

(29Nov71)

..

This appeal presents the question whether a Member of Congress may
be prosecuted for

ac~epting

a bribe in exchange for a promisetoperform a
'
certain o££icialA.act unde~ 18 U.S. C. §,§ 201(c)(1), 20l(g). :A ppellee, a former
.
-1 I
United States Senator, was charged in five counts
of a ten-count indict-

~~~· >\..+\.JIZ.

I

I
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'
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ment, with counts one, three, · five, and seven alleging that on four separate
occasions, appellee, a member of the Senate Committee on Post O££ice and
Civil Service,
"directly and indirectly, corruptly asked, solicited,
sought, accepted, received and agreed to receive
[sums] • . • in return for being influenced in his
performance of official acts in respect to his action,
vote, and decision on postage rate legislation which
might at any time be pending before him in his

I

. I

I ~.
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I

The remaining five counts charged the alleged bribers with o££ering and giving bribes in violation of 18 U.S. C. § 201(b).
I

f
I

\

'' ,

-2official capacity • • • in violation of Secjions 20l(c)(l)
and 2, Title 18, United States Code. 11 f.
Count nine charged that appellee
"directly and indirectly, asked, demanded, exacted,
solicited, sought, accepted, received and agreed to
receive [a sum] • . . for and because of official acts performed by him in respect to his action, vote and decision on postage rate legislation which had been
pending before him in his official capacity • . • in
violation of Sections 20l(g) and 2, Title 18, United
States Code. 11 2./

f./
18 U.S. C. 20l(c)(l) (1970 ed.) provides "Whoever, being a public
')fficial or person selected to be a public official, directly or indirectly
corruptly asks, demands, exacts, solicits, seeks, accepts, receives, or
agrees to receive anything of value for himself or for any other person or
entity, in return for:
(1) being influenced in his performan~e of any official act ••• [shall
be guilty o£ an offense]. 11
18 U.S. C. §20l(a) defines "public official" to include "Member of
Congress. 11 The same sub-section provides: "'official act' means any decision or action on any question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding or controversy, which may at any time be pending or which may by law be brought
before any public official, in his official capacity, or in his place of trust or
profit." 18 U.S. C. § 2 (1970 ed.) is the aiding or abetting statute.
'}../

18 U.S. C. 20l(g) (1970 ed.) provides: "Whoever, being a public official, former public official, or person selected to be a public official,
otherwise than as provided by law for the proper discharge of official duty,
directly or indirectly asks, demands, exacts, solicits, seeks, accepts, receives, or agrees to receive anything of value for himself for or because of
any official act performed or to be performed by him ••• [shall be guilty of
an offense]. 11
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Appellee moved to dismiss the indictment on the ground of immunity
under the Speech or Debate Clause, Article I, Section 6 of the Constitution,
which provides:
"for any Speech or Debate in either House, they
[Senators or Representatives] shall not be questioned in any other Place. 11
After hearing argument, the District Court ruled from the bench:
"Gentlemen, based on the facts of this case,
it is admitted by the Government that the five counts
of the indictment which charge Senator Brewster relate to the acceptance of bribes in connection with
the performance of a legislative function by a Senator of the United States.
"It is the opinion of this Court that the immunity
under the Speech and Debate Clause of the Constitution,
particularly in view of the interpretation given that
Clause by the Supreme Court in Johnson, shields Senator Brewster, constitutionally shields him from any
prosecution for alleged bribery to perform a legislative
act .

I

I

i

I will, therefore, dismiss the odd counts of the
indictment, 1, 3, 5, 7 and 9, as they apply to Senator
Brewster. 11
\
11

No evidence had yet been introduced in this case.
The United States sought a direct appeal to this Court, pursuant to

4/
18 U.S . C. § 3731 (Supp. V 1970).
diction.

We postponed consideration of juris-

United States v. Brewster, 401 U . S . 935 ( 1971 ).

4/
18 U.S . C. § 3731 has since been amended to eliminate the direct
appeal provision on which the Un~ted States relies , 84 Stat . 1890. This
appeal , ·however , was perfected under the old statute .

•:

~.

I.
I
I.

-4I
I

The United States claims that this Court has jurisdiction under 18 U.S. C.

§ 3731 (Supp. V 1970) to reviewthe District Court's dismissal of the
against appellee.

indictm.en~

Specifically, the United States claims that the District Court :

decision was either "a decision or judgment setting aside, or dis1nissing [an]
indictment ••• or any count thereof, where such decision or judgment is based
upon the invalidity or construction of the stat'l;Lte upon:which the indictment •. · :
is founded" or' 'the decision or judgment sustaining a motion in bar, when the
defendant has not been put in jeopardy.

11

If the District Court decision is

correctly characterized by either of those descriptions, this Court has · juris- .
diction under the statute to hear the United States 1 appeal.
In United States v. Knox, 396 U.S. 77 (1969), we considered a direct
appeal by the United States from the dismissal of an indictment that charged
the appellee in that case with violating 18 U.S. C. § 1001, a general criminal
provision punishing !raudulent statements made to any federal agency.

The

appellee, Knox, had been accused of willfully understating the number of
employees accepting wagers on his behalf when he filed a form which persons
engaged in the business of accepting wagers were required by law to file.

The

District Court dismissed the counts charging violations of § 1001 on the ground
that the appellee could not be prosecuted for failure to answer the wagering
form correctly since his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination
prevented prosecution £or failure to file the form in any respect.

I.

~

..

~

~.

-5We found jurisdiction under § 3731 to hear the appeal in Knox, on the
theory that the District Court had held invalid the statute on which the indict.

-

ment rested.
that

11

I

396 U.S., at 79, n. 2.

The Distl·ict Court in that case held

§ 1001, as applied to this class of cases., is constitutionally invalid.

11

The counts of the indictment involved in the instant case were based
on 18 U.S. C. § 201, a bribery statute.

Section 201 applies to "public officials,

and that term is defined to explicitly include Members of Congress as well
as other employees and officers of the United States.
prohibit the accepting of a
ing an official act.

bri~e

Sections (c)(l) and (g)

in return for being influenced in or perf orm-

The ruling of the District Court here was that all leg is-

lative activity of a Member of Congress is protected by the Speech or Debate
Clause from prosecution under § 201.

Since that sectio!l applies only to

bribery for the performance o'f official acts, the District Court 1 s ruling is
tha~

as applied to Members of Cop.gress, '

valid.

§ 201 is constitutionally in-

We conclude that under Knox, this Court has jurisdiction to . hear the

appeal.
Appellee argues that the action of the District Court was not "a decision or judgment setting aside, or dismissing 11 the indictment, but was instead
a summary judgment on the merits.

The District Court, according to appellee,

did not rule that § 201 could never be constitutionally applied to a C.ongressman, but that "based on the facts of this case" the statute could not be con.

.

stitutionally applied.

Under United States v. Sisson, 399 U.S. 267 (1970), ·

. I

11

-6an appeal does not lie from a decision that depends, not upon the sufficiency of
I

the indictment alone, but upon extraneous facts.

If the indictment is dismissed

as a result of a stipulation or the showing of evidentiary facts outside the indictment, which would constitute a defense on the merits at trial, no appeal is
available.

See United States v. Findley, 439 F. 2d 970 (1st Cir., 1971).

Ap-

pellee claims that the District Court relied on facts outside the scope of the
indictment.
However, an examination of the record discloses that, with the except ion of
''

a letter in which the United States briefly outlined its case against appellee, there

I

· are no'·Ufacts" other than those recited in the ,indictment.

Appellee, citing the

language "based on the facts of this case'' used by the District Judge in announcing his decision, contends that the District Court must have relied on the
government's revelation of the outlines of its case.
Judge's reference to

11

We read the District

facts" in context as being related to facts charged and

his ruling was that Members of Congress .are protected from prosecution for
accepting bribes for the .performance o£

official,~,

by virtue o£ the Speech or Debate Clause.

legislative, acts

Under that interpretation, there is

no way in which § 201 may be applied to Congressmen who accept bribes.

We

conclude, therefore, that the District Court was not relying on any facts
outside the indictment, and that his ruling was that the statute was unconstitutional as applied to Congressmen.

I

-7II

On only one other occasion has the Court faced a direct conflict between the prosecution of an allegedly bribed Congressman and the Speech or
Debate Clause.

In United St ates v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169 (1966), we review e d

the conviction of a former Representative on seven counts of violating the federal
conflict of interest statute, 18 U.S. C. § 281 ( 1964 ed.) and on one count of
conspiracy to defraud the United States, 18 U.S. C. § 371 (1964 ed.) There
the Court of Appeals set aside the conviction on the conspiracy to defraud
count, and Mr. Justice Harlan, speaking for the Court, traced the history o£
Clause
the Speech or Debat'e[o£ our Constitution from the Parliamentary privile g e that
culminated a long struggle l?etween the English Parliament and the Crown.

Mr.

Justice Harlan cited the oft-quoted passage of Mr .• Justice Lush in E x Parte Wa s o n,

L. R. 4 Q. B. 573 (1869):
"I am clearly of the opinion that we ought not to allow
it to be doubted for a moment that the motives or intentions of member.s of .either House cannot be inquired
into by_ crimira 1 proceedings with respect to anything
they may do or say in the House." Id., at 577.
(Emphasis added)
The Court concluded that the purpose of the privilege in our constitutional scheme was to protect ·the independence and irtegrity of the legislature
and to reinforce the separati.o n of powers.

Nearly a century ago, the Court

..

held, in Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103· U.S. 1,68 (1881), that the privilege is to
be read broadly to include anything

11

~

generally done in a session of the House

by one of its members in relation to the business before it.

11

103 U.S., at 204.
. I

-8Having concluded in Johnson. that the privilege protected members
£rom inquiry into the motivation o£ legislative acts, the Court focused on the
specific facts o£ the Johnson prosecution.

The conspiracy to defraud count alleged

an agreement among Representative Johnson and his three codefendants to obtain the dismissal of pending indictments against officials o£ Savings and Loan
institutions.

For these services, including the speech made in the House,

Johnson was allegedly paid in the form of campaign contributions and legal
fees.

To prove that in making this speech Johnson was, as the government's

attorney put it in his summation, doing "a day's work £or a day's pay,

11

383

U.S., at 175, n. 6, the government at trial questioned Johnson extensively concerning the authorship o£ the speech, the factual basis £or certain statements
..na de in the speech, and his motivation £or the speech.

The Court held that

this evidence, in connection with a broad conspiracy statute, was prohibited
by the Speech or Debate Clause.

The government was, therefore, precluded

£rom prosecuting the ccnspiracy count, insofar as it depended on inquiries
into his speeches, as being offensive to the · Speech or Debate privilege.
The Court's actual holding in Johnson,

however, was narrow:

"We hold that a prosecution under a general crimir.a 1
statute dependent on such inquiries necessarily contravenes the Speech or Debate Clause. We emphasize that
our holding is limited to prosecutions involving circumstances
such as those presented in the case before us. 11 383 U.S.,
at 84-85.
The opinion thus
~ion,

specifically left open the question o£ a prosecu-

which though possibly entailing some reference to legislative acts or

.

motivations, is founded upon a

11

,-

narrowly drawn" statute passed by Congress

1
in the exercise of its power to regulate its Members
conduct.
. '

Of mol e rele4

vance to this case, the Court in Johnson. emphasized that its decision did not
touch a prosecution which, though founded on a criminal statute of general
application,

11

does not draw in question the legislative acts of the defendant

member of Congress or his motives for performing them.

11

383 U.S., at 185.

The Court did not question the power of the United States to try Johnson on the :
I

conflict of interest counts, and authorized a new trial on the conspiracy count,
provided that a 11 references to the rna king o£ the speech were eliminated.

2./

Since Johnso n , the Court has twice construed the Speech or Debate
Clause.

In Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U.S. 82 (1967), the Court indicated

that legislators, in the sphere of their legislative activity, should be protected
from the burden Qf defending themselves.

The Court affirmed a summary

judgment dismissing a civil suit against a Senator alleged to have engaged in
a conspiracy to deny certain claimed civil rights in the course of a legislative ,
inquiry.

See Powell v.McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969).

§./
The Court ruled.' with three members dissenting, that the conviction
on the conflict of interest counts was. tainted by evidence of the speech, and
therefore reversed for a new trial on all counts. On remand, the District
Court dismissed the conspiracy CO\lnt, without objection from the government. '
Johnson was then found guilty on the remaining counts, and his conviction was
affirmed. United States v. Johnson, 419 F. 2d 56 (4th Cir., 1969), cert. denied,
397 u.s. 1010 (1970).

.

~.

~.
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The govermnent, then, may prosecute a Member of Congress under
an appropriate statute provided that it does not rely on evidence of legislative ;
acts or motivation for official conduct.

If an indictment does not depend on

such inadmissible evidence and if evidence of legislative acts or motivation
is not introduced, the Speech or Debate Clause is not contravened regardless
of whether the statute is narrowly drawn or of general application.

III
An examination of the indictment brought against appellee and the

statutes on which it is founded reveals that no inquiry into legislative acts or
motivations is necessary in order for the government to make out a prima
facie case.

Four of the five counts charge that appellee "corruptly asked,

solicited, sought, accepted, received, and agreed to receive" money ''in return for being influenced ••• in respect to his action, vote, and decision on
postage rate legislation, which might at any time be pending before him in his
official capacity.

11

This is said to be a violation of 18 U.S. C. § 20l(c)(l),

which provides that a Member who "corruptly asks, demands, exacts, solicits,
seeks, accepts, receives, or agrees to receive anything of value ••• in return for ••• being influenced in his performance of any official act" is guilty '
of an offense.

To prove a violation of this statute under this indictment, it is

not; necessary to inquire into how appellee spoke, how he debated, or even how
he voted.

The illegal conduct is taking or agreeing to take money for a promise

to vote in a certain way.

There is no need for the govermnent to show that ap-

">ellee fulfilled the alleged illegal bargain; acceptance of the bribe is a violation

~

..

~.

'
-J.J.-

of the statute.

The offense, in short, is taking the bribe, not the perforr.a-

ance of the illegal promise.
Taking a bribe is, obviously, not pal·t of the functioning of the legisla- 1
dIS no+ a. .... •-ff,t:.tf<\./tA.cfa-~ ,··h >nof.:... kJI5,.._..-hvc. &O...c,j-.

tive

process~ l~h:e....John.s.on
/

b

.

Co

1

~hal'-g.ed-wi.th ~-W'J

(j v;. IN'<--~

~a~
bribe..-t-~e.r
vari~rv-i-c'e""sin~i.ng-u"S"eoJ''hi-6-influenc·ewith
-~---

} .)}
·1
,,1\.s~~·
- ..---

·th"~t~no~·hie'\te--S'Oni"eob-~&O\.l.g-ht-by-t'h'ftb'rib-e:r-:--i\1-o-reover,
f"\1 G-tfd) wl"J.,C~ n\~ :>~t-~1~t"c J r.Jhe.:'/h.QA""___-]'"'-'J mv.--rlI

}).)!(, > J+

~the

"'

promise for which the bribe was given was(for the performance of a :

. ?

legislative act,

'O:;~e.,S

·,t

.

it-wo'l.ll:d-n~Amatter

.

.

!

that the Member defaulteca on his illegal

bargain? If, for example, there were undisputed evidence that a Mem.ber took
a bribe in exchange for an agreement to vote for a bill and if the f e were al~ o
the
d l!Jc.·s l l11s ~ )f.:...rjks>... r~i~~ V'(
undisputed evidende that he, in fact, voted against:,A ·bill, he~-a-s-noneth'?l-ess19{ (f.v.._ pt_Cf qy- ~rl-\o Vc;:. 1 f flo,. fhc:. lilO.t'CA of ~r'irfJAQJ"?J /1--u.. s:i::.=l u (< ...,~_ ...
taken__e. bribe .a..s-a-n1.att'er-of-fact-and-may-he-four.i.d-by-the-trie.~s-t.o...ha..v..e~ola t ed.L-u vz fj Y'C:..~i s~~lf 1 J,)- ·h trtAkc. a.. c::.rjl?!'- ? •
the-st.ablte as a matter o£ ~w. Indeed, he offends the House and the public interest less if he breaches his "contract 11 than if he performs it.
Another count of the indictment against appellee alleges that he "asked,

1

demanded, exacted, solicited, sought, accepted, received, and a greed to
~I
in rereceive" money "for and because of official acts performed by him
spect to his action, vote and decision on postage rat-.e legislation which had been
pending before him in his official capacity.

11

This count is founded on 18 U.S. C.

§ 20l(g), which provides that a Member of Congress who

11

asks, demands, exacts,

solicits, seeks, accepts, receives, or agrees to receive anything of value for

2./

\....__..c

We note that in this count, the indictment addresses itself a bribe
:or "acts performed" whereas the other counts rna y be read as charging
acceptance of a bribe for a eta both performed and to be performed.

I

,·

~.
~.

-12himself for or because of any official act performed or to be perfonned by
him" is guilty of an offense.

Although the indictment alleges actual perform-

ance of an official act for which a bribe is later given, it is once again unnecessary to inquire into the act or its motivation.

To sustain a conviction

it -is necessary to show that appellee received or agreed to receive money
'

knowing that the donor was paying him compensation for an official act.

In-

quiry into the act itself is not necessary; only appellee's knowledge of the
alleged briber 1 s improper rea sons for offering and paying the money must
be shown.

Jndc.<:!.J
The S_Reech or Debate Clause must be read broadly to effectuate its

~,. ,., f'P ''".~ cf ~-F~ I'J ,:, ~ p Y'Q "fc.c:;ho VI

.

-fo oJ~"' /11 ~"-f'o.... Jl~i e~ ·c(.f s ~ ·F Jk lcj l~ J~~)v'<t

rpUl'-p<>S:Ef..s, but its purposes were never to be a shield for taking bribes.

If

-f.....,~h:~

bribery is made a crime and if it is shown without an inquiry into how a Member actually performed legislative acts or into his motives, it does not impinge
on Speech or Debate immunity to hold that a Member can be held to answer

c..-:; )')CC 1-f It"

C. Y'"tt~Jt\""- (

~c:-"t l•'l }\..«. S.c1v'~ 10.. V'l\~trtl\v("..-:..~

forA wh:=t"'other citizens or officials must answer.

I

I

Members of Congress did

not seek to usetheir Speech and Debate immunity to becorr.1.e super-citizens·k:,

f'ro""'

t~r.. f'-C'VI"' I Lie..s ~f

The Speec'h or Debate

brdJorv ... ., 1 t'f)o.t'v (f"l,~" -fr() "'1 ~""'~cld~s> ~v-iv,·l-\ 5 ·
Clause sought to protect legislative independence so '

that legislators could be responsive to their constituents rather than to an
over-reaching Executive or Judiciary.

A legislator who accepts illegal

offers of money, however, is not res pond ing to his constituents nor is

..

~

he performing an offic.ial or legislative act.

We hold that Congress m,ay

enact legislation designed to punish the acceptance of bribes without

~.
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IV
In reversing the District Court's ruling that a Member of Congress
may not be constitutionally tried for a violation of the federal bribery statutes,
we express no views on the question left open .: in Johnson
as to the legitin'lacy
.
'

of an inquiry into legislative acts or motivation if Congress specifically

authorizes such in a narrowly drawn statute.

Under this statute and this in-

dictment, no such inquiry is necessary to sustain a conviction.

Should such

an inquiry be made and should a conviction be sustained, then we might face
the questions of whether this is a "narrowly drawn statute passed by Congress
i

in the exercise of its legislative power to regulate the conduct of its members"
and if inquiry into legislative acts and motivation is permissible under such '
a narrowly drawn statute.
Nor do we face a case in which the defendant Member o£ Congress
alleges that a prosecution, otherwise permissible under the Speech or Debate
I

Clause, is politically motivated and hence an interference with the separation
of powers • . Such an issue will always be open for consideration when a proper
case arises.

We hold only that on this statute and this indictment, prosecution

of appellee is not prohibited by the Speech or Debate Clause.

Accordingly the

judgment of the District Court is reversed and the case is remanded for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

~-~
~u:prtmt

Qf!lud 4lf tlrt 'J!inittlt .itattg

~aGlrtnghm. ~.

<!f.

2llgt){.~

CHAMBERS OF"

THE CHIEF" .JUSTICE

November 30,

~~ l>-tL

..,.., e.-~ ~....

~~

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE:

No. 70-45 -- U.S. v. Brewster

I enclose a first draft of my own view of a disposition
of this appeal.
It is an important case and a close question that falls
within the express reservation John Harlan carefully carved out
in Johnson.
I do not propose action on this draft.
information.

(jl,A...

Rather it is for

It seems to me too important to dispose of with

seven when we are likely weeks or even days from a full Court.
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No. 70-45 -- U.S. v. Brewster
(WORK DRAFT

(29Nov71)

CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER delivered the opinion of the Court.
T_his appeal presents the question whether a Member of Congress may
be prosecuted for accepting a bribe in exchange for a promiseto perform a
certain official act under 18 U.S. C. §§ 20l(c)(l), 20l(g). Appellee, a former

]j
United States Senator, was charged in five counts

of a ten-count indict-

-

ment, with counts one, three, five, and seven alleging that on four separate
occasions, appellee, a member of the Senate Committee on Post Office and
Civil Service,
"directly and indirectly, corruptly asked, solicited,
sought, accepted, received and agreed to receive
[sums] • . . in return for being influenced in his
performance of official acts in respect to his action,
vote, and decision on postage rate legislation which
might at any time be pending before him in his

]j
The remaining five counts charged the alleged bribers with offering and giving bribes in violation of 18 U.S. C. § 20l(b).

-2official capacity . • • in violation of Secjions 20l(c)(l)
and 2, Title 18, United States Code." ~
Count nine charged that appellee
''directly and indirectly, asked, demanded, exacted,
solicited, sought, accepted, received and agreed to
receive [a sum] • . • for and because of official acts performed by him in respect to his action, vote and decision on postage rate legislation which had been
pending before him in his official capacity • . . in
violation of Sections 20l(g) and 2, Title 18, United
States Code.'' 2/

~I

18 U.S. C. 20l(c)(l) (1970 ed.) provides ''Whoever, being a public
official or person selected to be a public official, directly or indirectly
corruptly asks, demands, exacts, solicits, seeks, accepts, receives, or
agrees to receive anything of value for himself or for any other person or
entity, in return for:
(1) being influenced in his performance of any official act . • . [shall
be guilty of an offense].''
18 U.S. C. §20l(a) defines "public official'' to include ''Member of
Congress." The same sub-section provides: "'official act' means any decision or action on any question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding or controversy, which may at any time be pending or which may by law be brought
before any public officia 1, in his official capacity, or in his place of trust or
profit. " 18 U.S. C. § 2 ( 1970 ed. ) is the aiding or abetting statute.

'i/
18 U.S. C. 2 01 (g) ( 1970 ed. ) provides: "Whoever, being a public official, former public official, or person selected to be a public official,
otherwise than as provided by law for the proper discharge of official duty,
directly or indirectly asks, demands, exacts, solicits, seeks, accepts, receives, or agrees to receive anything of value for himself for or because of
any official act performed or to be performed by him . . • [shall be guilty of
an offense]."

-3-
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Appellee moved to dismiss the indictment on the ground of immunity
I)

"'

under the Speech or Debate Clause, Article I, Section 6 of the Constitution,
which provides:
''for any Speech or Debate in either House, __tht;.J
[Senators or Representatives] shall not be que_!Ltioned in any other Place. "
After hearing argument, the District Court ruled from the bench:
"Gentlemen, based on the facts of this case,
it is admitted by the Government that the five counts
of the indictment which charge Senator Brewster ~
l_!te to the acceptance of brib_es in connection with
th~performance of a legislative function by a Senator of the United States.
"It is the opinion of this Court that the immunity
under the Speech and Debate Clause of the Constitution,
particularly in view of the interpretation given that
Clause by the Supreme Court in Johnson, shields Senator Brewster, constitutionally shields him from any
prosecution for alleged bribery to perform a legislative
act.
I wil~ therefore, dismiss the odd counts of the
indictment, 1, 3, 5, 7 and 9, as they apply to Senator
Brewster."
11

\

No evidence had yet been introduced in this case.
The United States sought a direct appeal to this Court, pursuant to

4/
18 U.S. C. § 3 731 (Supp. V 1970).
diction.

We postponed consideration of juris-

United States v. Brewster, 401 U.S. 935 (1971).

4/
18 U.S. C. § 3731 has since been amended to eliminate the direct
appeal provision on which the United States relies, 84 Stat. 1890. This
appeal, how ever, was perfected under the old statute.

-4I

The United States claims that this Court has jurisdiction under 18 U.S. C.

§ 3731 (Supp. V 1970) to review the District Court's dismissal of the indictment
against appellee.

Specifically, the United States claims that the District Court

decision was either "a decision or judgment setting aside, or dismissing [an]
indictment ••. or any count thereof, where such decision or judgment is based
upon the invalidity or construction of the statute upon which the indictment . . .
is founded" or' 'the decision or judgment sustaining a motion in bar, when the
defendant has not been put in jeopardy.

11

g;.p.e District Court decision is

correctly characterized by either of those descriptions, this Court has jurisd i , under the statute to hear the United States' appeal.
In United States v. Knox,
/

396 U.S. 77 ( 1969), we considered a direct

appeal by the United States from the dismissal of an indictment that charged
the appellee in that case with violating 18 U.S. C. § 1001, a general criminal
provision punishing fraudulent statements made to any federal agency.

The

appellee, Knox, had been accused of willfully understating the number of
employees accepting wagers on his behalf when he filed a form which persons
engaged in the business of accepting wagers were required by law to file.

The

District Court dismissed the counts charging violations of § 1001 on the ground
that the appellee could not be prosecuted for failure to answer the wagering
form correctly since his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination
prevented prosecution for failure to file the form in any respect.

-5-

< •

j

I

~ "'t

We found jurisdiction under § 3731 to hear the ?Lppeal in Knox, on the
theory that the District Court had held invalicJ.. the statute on which the indictment rested.
that

11

396 U.S., at 79, n. 2.

The District Court in that case held

§ 1001, as applied to this class of cases, is constitutionally invalid."
The counts of the indictment involved in the instant case were based

on 18 U.S. C. § 201, a bribery statute.

Section 201 applies to "public officials,"

and that term is defined to explicitly include Members of Congress as well'
as other employees and officers of the United States.

Sections (c)(l) and (g)

prohibit the accepting of a bribe in return for being influenced in or performing an official act.

The ruling of the District Court here was that all legis-

lative activity of a Member of Congress is protected by the Speech or Debate
Clause from prosecution under § 201.

Since that section applies only to

bribery for the performance of official acts, the District Court 1 s ruling is

-

tha~

as applied to Members of Congress,

valid.

§ 201 is constitutionally in-

We conclude that under Knox, this Court has jurisdiction to hear the

appeal.
Appellee argues that the action of the District Court was not ''a decision or judgment setting aside, or dismissing' 1 the indictment, but was instead
a summary judgment on the merits.

The District Court, according to appellee,

did not rule that § 201 could never be constitutionally applied to a Congressman, but that "based on the facts of this case" the statute could not be constitutionally applied.

Under United States v. Sisson, 399 U.S. 267 (1970),

-6-

-

an appeal does not lie from a decision that depends, not upon the sufficiency of
the indictment alone, but upon extraneous facts.

If the indictment is dismissed

as a result of a stipulation or the showing of evidentiary facts outside the indictment, which would constitute a defense on the merits at trial, no appeal is
available.

See United States v. Findley, 439 F. Zd 970 (1st Cir., 1971).

Ap-

pellee claims that the District Court relied on facts outside the scope of the
indictment.
However, an examination of the record discloses that, with the exception of
a letter in which the United States briefly outlined its case against appellee, there
are no ' 11 facts 11 other than those recited in the indictment.

Appellee, citing the

language "based on the facts of this case" used by the District Judge in announcing his decision, contends that the District Court must have relied on the
government's revelation of the outlines of its case.

We read the District

-

Judge's reference to "facts 11 in context as being related to facts charged and
h is ruling was that Members of Congress are protected from prosecution for
accepting bribes for the performance of official, i.e., legislative, acts
by virtue of the Speech or Debate Clause.

Under that interpretation, there is

no way in which § 201 may be applied to Congressmen who accept bribes.

We

conclude, therefore, that the District Court was not relying on any facts
outside the indictment, and that his ruling was that the statute was unconstitutional as applied to Congressmen.

-7II

On only one other occasion has the Court faced a direct conflict be-

l

tween the prosecution of an allegedly bribed Congre s sman and the Speech or
Debate Clause.

In United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169 (1966), we reviewed

the conviction of a former Representative on seven counts of violating the federal
conflict of interest statute, 18 U.S. C. § 281 (1964 ed.) and on one count of
conspiracy to defraud the United States, 18 U.S. C. § 371 (1964 ed.) There
the Court of Appeals set aside the conviction on the conspiracy to defraud
count, and Mr. Justice Harlan, speaking for the Court, traced the history of
Clause
the Speech or DebateJOf our Constitution from the Parliamentary privilege that
culminated a long struggle between the English Parliament and the Crown.

Mr.

Justice Harlan cited the oft-quoted passage of Mr. Justice Lush in Ex Parte Wason,
L. R. 4 Q. B. 573 (1869):
"I am clearly of the opinion that we ought not to allow
it to be doubted for a moment that the motives or intentions of members of either House cannot be inquired
into by crimim 1 proceedings with respect to anything
they may do or say in the House." Id., at 577.
(Emphasis added)
The Court concluded that the purpose of the privilege in our constitutional scheme was to protect the independence and irtegrity of the legislature
and to reinforce the separation of powers.
held, in Kilbourn v. Thompson,

Nearly a century ago, the Court

103 U.S. 1.68 ( 1881), that the privilege is to

-

be read broadly to include anything "generallY_ done in a session of the House
by one of its members in relation to the business before it.

11

103 U.S., at 204.

-8Having concluded in Johnson that the privilege protected members
from inquiry into the motivation of legislative acts, the Court focused on the
specific facts of the Johnson prosecution.

The conspiracy to defraud count alleged

an agreement among Representative Johnson and his three codefendants to obtain the dismissal of pending indictments against officials of Savings and Loan
institutions.

For these services, including the speech made in the House,

Johnson was allegedly paid in the form of campaign contributions and legal
fees.

To prove that in making this speech Johnson was, as the government's

attorney put it in his summation, doing "a day's work for a day's pay,

11

383

U.S., at 175, n. 6, the government at trial questioned Johnson extensively concerning the authorship of the speech, the factual basis for certain statements
rna de in the speech, and his motivation for the speech.

The Court held that

this evidence, in connection with a broad conspiracy statute, was prohibited
by the Speech or Debate Clause.

The government was, therefore, precluded

from prosecuting the ccnspiracy count, insofar as it depended on inquiries
into his speeches, as being offensive to the Speech or Debate privilege.
Court's actual holding in Johnson,

however, was narrow:

---=c:::=

1

We hold that a prosecution under a general crimiml
statute dependent on such inquiries necessarily contravenes the Speech or Debate Clause. We emphasize that
our holding is limited to prosecutions involving circumstances
such as those presented in the case before us. 11 383 U.S.,
at 84-85.
'

The opinion thus

specifically left open the question of a prosecu-

tion, which though possibly entailing some reference to legislative acts or

-9-

motivations, is founded upon a "narrowly drawn'' statute passed by Congress
in the exercise of its power to regulate its Members 1 conduct.
vance to this case, the Court in Johnson

Of more rele-

emphasized that its decision did not

touch a prosecution which, though founded on a criminal statute of general
application,

11

does not draw in question the legislative acts of the defendant

member of Congress or his motives for performing them.

11

383 U.S., at 185.

The Court did not question the power of the United States to try Johnson on the
conflict of interest counts, and authorized a new trial on the conspiracy count,
~I
provided that a 11 references to the making of the speech were eliminated.
Since Johnson, the Court has twice construed the Speech or Debate
Clause.

In Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U.S. 82 (1967), the Court indicated

that legislators, in the sphere of their legislative activity, should be protected
from the burden of defending themselves.

The Court affirmed a summary

judgment dismissing a civil suit against a Senator alleged to have engaged in
a conspiracy to deny certain claimed civil rights in the course of a 1egisla tive
inquiry.

See Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 ( 1969).

~I

The Court ruled, with three members dissenting, that the conviction
on the conflict of interest counts was tainted by evidence of the speech, and
therefore reversed for a new trial on all counts. On remand, the District
Court dismissed the conspiracy count, without objection from the government.
Johnson was then found guilty on the remaining counts, and his conviction was
affirmed. United States v. Johnson, 419 F. Zd 56 (4th Cir., 1969), cert. denied,
397 u.s. 1010 (1970).

-10The government, then, may prosecute a Member of Congress under
an appropriate statute provided that it does not rely on evidence of legislative
acts or motivation for official conduct.

If an indictment does not depend on

such inadmissible evidence and if evidence of legislative acts or motivation
is not introduced, the Speech or Debate Clause is not contravened regardless
of whether the statute is narrowly drawn or of general application.

III
An examination of the indictment brought against appellee and the

statutes on which it is founded reveals that no inquiry into legislative acts or
motivations is necessary in order for the government to make out a prima
facie case.

Four of the five counts charge that appellee "corruptly asked,

solicited, sought, accepted,

rec~ived,

and agreed to receive 11 money "in re-

turn for being influenced . . . in respect to his action, vote, and decision on
postage rate legislation, which might at any time be pending before him in his
official capacity.

11

This is said to be a violation of 18 U.S. C. § 20l(c)(l),

which provides that a Member who

11

corruptly asks, demands, exacts, solicits,

seeks, accepts, receives, or agrees to receive anything of value . • . in return for . • . being influenced in his performance of any official act 11 is guilty
of an offense.

To prove a violation of this statute under this indictment, it is

___,

not necessary to inquire into how appellee spoke, how he debated, or even how

-

he voted.

The illegal

-

conduct~

to vote in a certain way.

taking or agreeing to take money for a promise

There is no need for the government to show that ap-

pellee fulfilled the alleged illegal bargain; acceptance of the bribe is a violation

-11of the statute.

The offense, in short, is taking the bribe, not the perform-

ance of the illegal promise.
Taking a bribe is, obviously, not part of the functioning of the legislative process.

In the Johnson case, a Member of Congress was charged with

taking a bribe to render various services including use of his influence with
the Executive Branch to achieve some objective sought by the briber.

Moreover,

even if the promise for which the bribe was given was for the performance of a
legislative act, it would not matter that the Member defaulted on his illegal
bargain.

If, for example, there were undisputed evidence that a Member too

a bribe in exchange for an agreement to vote for a bill and if there were also
th~

undisputed evidence that he, in fact, voted against l bill, he has nonetheless
taken a bribe as a matter of fact and may be found by the triers to have violated
the statute as a matter of law.

Indeed, he offends the House and the public in-

terest less if he breaches his "contract 11 than if he performs it.
Another count of the indictment against appellee alleges that he "asked,
demanded, exacted, solicited, sought, accepted, received, and a greed to

§_/
receive" money "for and because of official acts performed by him

in re-

spect to his action, vote and decision on postage rat•. e legislation which had been
pending before him in his official capacity.

11

This count is founded on 18 U.S. C.

§ 20l(g), which provides that a Member of Congress who

11

asks, demands, exacts,

solicits, seeks, accepts, receives, or agrees to receive anything of value for

We note that in this count, the indictment addresses itself a bribe
for "acts performed 11 whereas the other counts may be read as cha r ging
acceptance of a bribe for acts both performed and to be performed.
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himself for or because of any official act performed or to be performed by
him" is guilty of an offense.

Although the indictment alleges actual perform-

ance of an official act for which a bribe is later given, it is once again unnecessary to inquire into the act or its motivation.

To sustain a conviction

it is necessary to show that appellee received or agreed to receive money
knowing that the donor was paying him compensation for an official act.

In-

quiry into the act itself is not necessary; only appellee's knowledge of the
alleged briber's improper rea sons for offering and paying the money must
be shown.
The Speech or Debate Clause must be read broadly to effectuate its
purposes, but its purposes were never to be a shield for taking bribes.

If

bribery is made a crime and if it is shown without an inquiry into how a Member actually performed legislative acts or into his motives, it does not impinge
on Speech or Debate immunity to hold that a Member can be held to answer
for what other citizens or officials must answer.

Members of Congress did

not seek to use their Speech and Debate immunity to become super-citizens.
The Speech or Debate Clause sought to protect legislative independence

so

that legislators could be responsive to their constituents rather than to an
over -reaching Executive or Judiciary.

A legislator who accepts illegal

offers of money, however, is not responding to his constitu:'ents nor is
he performing an official or legislative act.

We hold that Congress may

enact legislation designed to punish the acceptance of bribes without contravening the Speech or Debate Clause.

-13-

IV
In reversing the District Court's ruling that a Member of Congress
may not be constitutionally tried for a violation of the federal bribery statutes,
we express no views on the question left open in Johnson as to the legitimacy
of an inquiry into legislative acts or motivation if Congress specifically
authorizes such in a narrowly drawn statute.

Under this statute and this in-

dictment, no such inquiry is necessary to sustain a conviction.

Should such

an inquiry be made and should a conviction be sustained, then we might face
the questions of whether this is a "narrowly drawn statute passed by Congress
in the exercise of its legislative power to regulate the conduct of its members 11
and if inquiry into legislative acts and motivation is permissible under such
a narrowly drawn statute.
Nor do we face a case in which the defendant Member of Congress
alleges that a prosecution, otherwise permissible under the Speech or Debate
Clause, is politically motivated and hence an interference with the separation
of powers.
case arises.

Such an issue will always be open for consideration when a proper
We hold only that on this statute and this indictment, prosecution

of appellee is not prohibited by the Speech or Debate Clause.

Accordingly the

judgment of the District Court is reversed and the case is remanded for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
So ordered.
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CHAMBERS OF

.JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN

December 16, 1971

Re: No. 70-45 -

United States v. Brewster

Dear Chief:
I would be willing to join an opinion written
along the lines of your work draft circulated November 30.
Sincerely,

;v.i-1The Chief Justice

cc: The Conference
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January 17, 1972
CHAMBERS OF"

THE CHIEF .JUSTICE

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE:

No. 70-45 -- U.S. v. Brewster

I suggest this case should be set for reargument.
Regards,

~u:prtmr ~tturt

ttf tqt )tnittb j;tatea-

~a•qmgtcn. ~. ~· 20,?J.I.~
C HAMB E RS O F"

JUST ICE W'M . J . BRE N NAN . JR .

Jam.ary 17, 1.972

Dear Chief:
I have your memorandum suggestjng reargwnent in No. 70-5061,
Kirby v. Illinois, No. 70-26, Gooding v. Wilson and No. 70-45,
United States v. Brewster.
You indicate that you thought the votes in each of these cases was
4 to 3. My record shows that Gooding v. Wilson was 5 to 2 to affirm.
The votes to affirm were Thurgood, Byron, Potter, Bill Douglas and
I. The votes to reverse were yours and Harry's. I've circulated a
proposed opinion for the Court on that premise.

I

II
1:

I

My records do show that the votes in Kirby and Brewster were
both 4 to 3. In Kirby I've circulated an opinion which Bill Douglas
and Thurgood have joined. Byron has filed a separate opinion concurring in the judgment.
In Brewster, my record indicates that Potter, Thurgood and
Harry have joined your opinion and Bill Douglas has joined my
dissent. Byron also voted to affirm.
You'll remember that my view on reargument of 4 to 3 cases is
that this is a matter for conference discussion. Certainly, as in the
case of S & E Contractors, if at least four of seven vote reargument
then there should be reargument. I would suppose someone would
have to make the motion and then a vote be taken as we did Friday
in S & E Contractors. In any event, I see no reason for rearguing
Gooding v. Wilson if the five who voted to affirm remain of that
view and join my proposed opinion.

'·
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W. J. B. Jr.

cc: The Conference
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January 17, 1972

CHAMBERS 01'

THE CHIEF .JUSTICE

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE:
We have now set two cases for reargument and
there are others that seem to me should be similarly
treated.
The following are my "nominations 11 for rear gument.
No. 70-5061 --Kirby v. Illinois
No. 70-26
--Gooding v. Wilson
No. 70-45
-- U.S. v. · Brewster
I previously indicated my willingness to have S. & E.
Contractors v. U.S., and Lego v. Twomey reargued.

The

former is now scheduled for reargument and the latter has come
down.

There may be others, and generally I will vote to re-

argue any 4-3 case unless it is a "JMH pewee."
To facilitate filing problems, I am sending individual
memos on each o£ the above.
Regards,

~u.prnnt ~ ourt

of tl1 t 'Pnitc~ ,!§itntes

'Jlla.slpn~ttttt.

p.

~· 2o~n;J

CHAMBERS OF

January 17, 1972

JUSTICE WILLIAM 0 . DOUGLAS

Dear Chief:
I vote against putting down
for reargument the following cases:
No. 70-26

- Gooding v. Wilson

Uo. 70-45

- U. S. v. Brewster

No. 70-5061

•

- Kirby v. Illinois

~

\;J

\ '\ ..·

William 0. Douglas
The Chief Justice
CC:

The Conference

.I

I
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I

CHAMBERS OF'

JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN

January 18, 1972

Dear Chief:
This is in response to your memorandum of
January 17 concerning reargum.ents.
I nominate for reargument the two abortion
cases, No. 70-18, Roe v. WadE:.z and No. 70-40, Doe
v. Bolton. It seems to me that the importance of the
issues is such. that the cases merit full bench treatment.
I think another candidate is No. 70-58, Fein v.
Selective Service System.
So far as your nominations are concerned, my
reaction is that No. 70-45, United States v. Brewster,
because o£ its fundamental importance and precedent,
deserves reargument, and that No. 70-5061, Kirby v.
Illinois, should also be reconsidered. Justice White's
separate concurrence certainly so indicates.
In s'lnnmary, I vote to set down for reargument
Nos. 70-18 and 70-40, No. 70-45 and No. 70-5061. I
shall abide by the Conference's reaction as to No. 70-58.
Sincerely,

;v.A.

The Chief Justice

cc: The Conference

---

indictment with accepting a bribe in returned for being influenced
offictal acts
in the performance of his ~H~ixxxXiVKXXEXK and with accepting
a bribe because of official acts E
indicted under 18

u.s.c.

performed.E~xNim

He was

§201(c)(1) and (g) which specifically

make members of Congress subject to the penalties for bribery.
The other 5 counts of the indictment charged Cyrus T. Anderson,
a lobbist for Speigel, Inc., with having offered Brewster the
bribe in return for various votes on postage rate legislative.

CONTROLLING CASES: U. S. v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169 (1966);
United Srates v. Knox, 396 U.S. 77 (1969).
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Brewster moved to dismiss the counts of the indictment
relating to him on the ground that he was sheilded from such
a

prosecution by the Speech or Debate Clause.

~Nxx

was introduced.

No evidence

Instead, apparently because the indictment

indicated that Brewster had accepted bribes in return for votes
or promises to vote, Judge Hart dismissed the indictment ina
a ruling from the bench.

-----

No formal opinion was written.

govt made a direct appeal under 18

u.s.c.

The

(Supp. V) §3731

which permits such an appeal from a decision dismissing an
indictment because of the invalidty or construction of the
statute on which the indictment is founded and from a decision
sustaining a motion in bar, when the def has not been put in
R

jeopardy.

The Court postponed the jurisdictional question

to the hearing of the mx merits.
Since opinions have been circulated in this case, I shall
not go into the arguments at length.

None of the opinons

argues that the Court does not have jurisdiction over this
appeal.

Brewster argues that the llliEXNREix decision kx below

is a summary m judment on the merits, rather than a dismissal
of the indictment.

Such a summary judgment cannot be appealed

under the Courts decision in

U.S~.

Sissmn, 399 U.S. 267 (1970),

The argument that this is a summary judgment turns on a claim
that the ruling below was not based on the constitutional
invalidity of the statute per se, but was based on the invalidity
under these facts.

There is some language in the district court's

remarks from the bench to support such an interpretation.
But it is clear to me that the district court had not examined

-3-

the facts of the case to such an extent that his ruling could
be properly called a summary judgment.

The only facts before

him were the indictment itself anJa letter from the govt
alleged
stipulating that all the HEKixixex activities XRXHKRN in the
indictment were related to Brewster's legislative duties.
Thus, Judge Hart's ruling was that the statute could not

ge

1

constitutionally applied ; : Brewster if the indictment related

.f

to his legislative duties.

1
~~
~ ~nly

~

Sa Since the statute

it~f

pxa

makes bribes received in return for promises to perform

"official acts" a crime, it is difficult to see

MR}C

how any

~. indictment under that statute could be constitutionally applied
~·~ a Congressman. In short, the xXXXMXRxix ruling was that
~the statute was invalide, not as in SXxxiB SissQQ that the
facts put in by the govt did not amount to a xix violation of
the statute.
Given that interpretation of the ruling of Judge Hart,
it is clear that the opinion
below is appealable as a dismissal
__,
,..-.,

-

of an indictment because of the invalidl.ity of the statute on
which it was based.

It is true that Judge Hart did not rule

that the entire bribery statute was unconstitutional, as Brewster
points out, but only that it was unconstitutional when applied
to Congressmen, But in U.S. v. Knox, 396 U.S. 77 (1969), the
Court recognized, in a
if the statute was

footnof~ tha~ direct appeal was permissible

rule~unconstitutional

certain class of cases.

'

when applied to a

Knox was indicted for mistatements

in his tax forms, a law of broad applicability.

The law was

held by the district court to be unconstitutional when applied

-4-

to wagering tax forms because to require a gambler to fill
out these forms violated his right against self-incrimination.
But the law against mistating tax forms was not held to be
unconstitutional when applied to everyone, just to the class
of persons in which Knox fell.

The Court neverteeless found

jurisdiction to hear a direct appeal.

k~~

Brewster's only

refutation of Knox is a rather weak argument that the ruling
was ill-considered because it was in

fxxf~xixx

It seems to me that the rule makes sense.

a footnote.

If instead of passing

one statute making it a crime for all kinds of federal employees
and officials to accept bribes, the Congress has passed a
seperate statute for each class of employee, and if the district
court had

N2X~XXN2xsxxxNxe

made the same substantive ruling it

made here xkxxxaxt resulting in a declaration of the unconstitutionality of the statute applying to Congressmen, there would be
no question of this Court's jurisdictmon.

The mere fact that

Congress enacted one statute rather than an

ineffic~ent

dozen,

should not alter the jurisdictional result.
Alternatively, the govt argues that this appeal may be made
because the ruling below was a plea in bar.
what a

~exx

-

No one knows precisely

plea in bar is; Justices Stewart and Harlan have

differed on its meaning in the past.

After the briefs were

filed in this case, the Court handed down its decision in

u.s.

v. Marion, No. 70-19, decided Dec. 20, 1971, in which it sustained
a direct appeal from a plea in bar.

It

sxx~

said that a plea in

bar was like
"a plea in the nature of confession and avoidance, that is,
where the defendantddoes not deny that he has committed
the acts alleged an that tfie acts were a cr~me but

-5-

instead pleads that he cannot be prosecuted because of
some extraneous factor, such as the tolling of the
statutte of limitations or the denial of a speedy trial."

Under that interpretation of a Exexx plea in bar, I do not
Brewster did not admit
·.......
the act but claim some extraneious factor intervened. Nor

think that ki the ruling below fits.

did he admit that the act of accepting a bribe by a Congressman
is a bribe; he contends that it cannot be a crime.

Therefore,

I do not think this Court has jurisdiction under the plea in
A
A.. L-"
~
~

bar rule.

~--'-~.~
~ -

The merits of this case raise« the Speech or Debate

-

-

-

Clause which the Court has only considered on five occasions.
Only one of those opinions, U.S.
.. v. Johnson, is directly relevant
to this appeal.

Johnson was convicted =after trial on 8 counts.

Seven of those counts alleged that he had taken a bribe in
return sf for using his influence with the Justice Dept

x

in

an attempt to persuade the Dpet to drop various proceedings
against Md savings and loan institut~.
not challenged on appeal.

Those 7 counts were

Instead the appeal focused on the

eighthcount which alleged that Johnson had been bribed to make
a speech on the floor of the House in defense of Md savings and
loan institutions.
on the content

N£

To prove this account, the govt focused
of the speech and the motivation for it.

The Court, speaking xksxa through Justice Harlan, reversed
the conviction NRXXRXKXNRRXENN because of the method in which
the govt proved this one count, and remanded for a new trial
on all counts because the evidence from the one bad count
»XX might have tainted the jury in ruling on the other 7.

(The dissent focused only on the remand order; Justices Warren,
Douglas, and

~rennan

thought that the other 7

EN~

counts had

-6-

not been xxiRHK tainted and did not need to be retried.

Justices

Black and White did not participate.)
The opinion determined that the primary purpose of the
Speech or Debate Clause was to preserve the independence of the
legislative branch from the power of the executive to bring
prosecutions and of the judiciary to try them.

It was in

this connection, that the Court ruled that under a statute of

------

-------

general application, Congressmen could

~

-

not be prosecuted if

the prosecution would x inquire into legislative XEKXl acts, i.e.,
things generally done or said in a legislature, or into the
motivation for legislative acts. The Court, however, necessarily
•

interpreted legislative acts somewhat narrowly since it did
not regard axe attempts to influence the executive branch on
behalf of a constituent, an act commonly engaged in by Congressmen,
as a legislative act.

What if it did not permit was proof about

Johnson's

~HHE

it.

Moreover, the Court left open a possible exception to

~Ri~

speech to the House and his reasons for giving

its general rule in the case of a narrowly-drawn statute that
delegation to the executive and judiciary
would serve as a specificxixx/XNxk~xxxxxx~R ~f by Congress of
its powere to discipline its members.
It is on this last exception that the briefs in this case
f~NE

focus.

I do not intend to deal with the argument at great

length because it is irrelevant to the approach the Court took
to this case in the opinions circulated ea~er this year.
If the issue had to be reached, however, I would agree with
Part II of Justice Brennan's opinion that the narrowly-drawn
exception--which Harlan avoided ruling on rather than endorsed-is prohibited by the

S~~R

Speech or Debate Clause.

The govt's

-7- arguments seem to me to ignore the inter-relationship
between Artptie I, Section 5 which gives Congress the power
to discipline its members and ArtRfle I. Section 6 which gxxex
denies x anyone but Congress to question Congressmen about
legislative acts.

Taken together, I think those clauses mean

that only Congress can discipline a member for a legislative

-

act.

I do not see how a majority of Congress could delegate

t his power, which

and freedom of the
government.

I

need

b~

i~

after al) concerned with the independence

mxRNXX

minority, to another branch of the

But as I said, I do not think that this issue

reached because the indictment is sustainable in

KRXX

another way.
The Chief's opinion expresses the »xe view that it is

possible under this indictment

NX

to bring a case against

Brewster without ever inquiring into a legislative act or
the motivation for a legislative act.
is that Brewster made a promise

XNX

All that need be shown

in return for money to

perform a legislative act or that iRxxe he was

~xNi

paid by

his briber because the briber believed that Brewster had
performed a legislative act in a certamn way.

It is not

necessary to prove that Brewster ever voted at all, much less
which way xN and for what reason.

Therefore, a narrow reading

of Johnson would permit the indictment to be broughti in this
case.

I

The dissenters would read Johnson more »xxNN broadly

to hold that the Speech or Debate Clause covers anthing related

to a legislative act.

(Incidentally, this related to ~·

wxw quoted by Justice Brennan

XNXM

from Johnson is, I

.

·

,

-8-

taken out of context.

See 383

u.s.

at 172.)

This is done

primarily on the belief that to further limit the executive's
power to bring prosecutions willx
independence.

~xsm±x

But I xx suggest that

let out of the bag by Johnson.
gaRgx2KSM«Rxfax

~cfs

promote legislative

that~

particular cat was

xxxxk~x~sxxx~aNx~xsx~~x~x

such as attempting to influence the

Justice Dept are not legislative acts and may be subject to
prosecution, than I suggest xkxxx that the

~sxxx

executive's

power to harass and intimidate legislators will not be increased
by the Chief's reading of Johnson.

Moreover, it is t clear to

me that attempting to influence the executive branch would
be reated to a legislative act, within the meaning Justice
Brennan ascribes to that term,

«~x~xx~xxk~xxxx~xxxsN

Johnson ruled such acts could be prosecuted.

But

Finally, as a

practical matter, it seems to me that the threat to legislative
indpendence from potential bribers is at least as great as
~

from a hostile executve or judiciary.

~----------------------~-------~-That is a somewhat sketch/overview

of the arguments

advanced in the circulated opinions, but xx since you have
those

s~±NRNN

opinions, there is little use for me to cover

the same ground.

I beleive that there is jurisdiction here

and that the case should be reversed and remanded for trial
to see if the govt can prove its case without introducing
evidence of legislative acts or of motivation for legislative
acts.

If not, and if a conviction is sustained upon x evidences

of legislative acts, than the Court can consider the narrowlydrawn exception.

REVERSE

Fox

"Random Thoughts" on No. 70-45 -- U.S. v. Brewster

The dissenting opinions of Mr. Justice Brennan and Mr.
Justice White assume that any inquiry into any bribe sought by or
given to a Member of Congress by someone who hopes to influence
him is an inquiry into the motivation for a "legislative act." They
point out that in Johnson we held that such in inquiry into motivation was prohibited by the Speech or Debate Clause.

But in

Johnson the government's proof was that Johnson had made a speech
on the floor of the House

in return for a bribe and it was pre-

cis ely this -- and only this --which led to a remand to see if the
government could make out a case without showing some legislative
act.

Johnson was retried without evidence of the speech, convicted,

and brought no appeal here.

In Brewster's case, unlike Johnson,

there is no need to prove that Senator Brewster engaged in any
legislative act or that he intended to perform any legislative act
for the bribe.

All that the government need prove is that Senator

Brewster solicited, received or was promised a bribe in return for
some agreement, regardless of whether or not he performed any
act in return.

The dissents seem to suggest that if the subject

of criminal inquiry might have motivated a legislative act, (had
Brewster honorably (?) kep: his bargain!), the Speech or Debate
Clause applies.

I suggest that such a rule would actually require

-2-

a substantial inquiry into legislative motivation that is quite out of
keeping with the Speech or Debate Clause.

A bribe may motivate

a Congressman to perform a legislative act or it may motivate him
to assert his influence with members of the executive branch -an activity which we specifically held, in Johnson, may be the basis
for a prosecution.

Under the dissenting views, an inquiry into

whether or not a bribe could have possibly motivated a Member
to perform any legislative act would be essential before the prosecution could be brought.

Indeed, under such a rule, Johnson would

have been able to say that the bribe he a:::cepted not only motivated
him to attempt to influence the Justice Department but also motivated
him to give a speech in Congress.

Since that bribe motivated a

legislative act as well as a non-legislative act on the same subject,
the executive and judicial branches should not have been allowed to
make it the subject of a prosecution.

Yet, as long as there was no ,

direct inquiry into a legislative act or into whether the bribe did
in fact motivate a legislative act, we held that the government could
prosecute.
In fact, the dissenting position assumed that Senator Brewster
voted a certain way on postage legislation because he had been paid
a bribe.

Without such an assumption, his alleged acceptance of

a bribe cannot be accurately characterized as legislative motivation.
I would agree with the dissent that the Speech or Debate Clause
would be contravened --leaving aside the possibility of a
narrowly-drawn statute -- if the government attempted to prove that

-3-

Senator Brewster performed a legislative act because he received
a bribe.

But if the prosecution proves only that he received the

bribe, and shows no "speech or debate", or legislative act, we see ,
no constitutional barrier .to prosecution.

The government does not

call on a Congressman to answer for a legislative act simply by
testimony that the bribe payer hoped or expected to get something
for his money.

Brewster could, if he wished, show he voted

against the interests of the briber (or cast no vote) but this would
be no more than evidence in the scales.
Mr. J"ustice Brennan suggests that Johnson held that the standard of what is protected from executive or judicial inquiry by the

.

Speech or Debate Clause is whether the conduct looked into is
"related to the due functioning of the legislative power.

11

He cites

the Jchnson opinion, 383 U.S. at 172, for the quoted words.

With

all respect, the quoted words are taken out of context and do not
fairly represent the holding of Johnson. The indictment in Johnson
contained eight counts.

Only one was challenged as in violation

of the Speech or Debate Clause.

The other seven counts, involving

Johnson's attempts to influence the executive, were not attacked.
In that context, Mr. Justice Harlan, speaking for the Court, wrote:
No argument is made, nor do we think that it could be
successfully contended, that the Speech or Debate Clause
reaches conduct, such as was involved in the attempt to
influence the Department of Justice, that is in no wise
related to the due functioning of the legislative process.
It is the application of this broad conspiracy statute to an
improperly motivated speech that raises the constitutional
problem with which we deal. (emphasis supplied)

-4Thus, the phrase "related to the due functioning of the legislative
process'' was used in the negative to fence off those counts of the
indictment not involved in the Court's opinion.

Justice Harlan was

not really saying that a conference by a Congressman with the
Executive Branch was not part of the usual activity of a Congressman
but merely

distinguishing two different activities that were pre-

sented on that record.
who failed "to deliver.
The Johnson

He had no occasion to treat a bribe taker
11

Court did not imply the breadth of activities

covered by the Clause which Mr. Justice Brennan and Mr. Justice
White would find covered.

The Court would be closing its eyes, to

borrow Mr. Justice White's phrase, to "[t]he realities of the
American political system" if it failed to acknowledge that attempts
to influence other branches of the government are one of the activities in which Congressmen engage.

Yet the Court specifically

held in Johnson that inquiry into such activities was not prohibited
and Johnson's conviction followed and was not reviewed.

Surely

the possibility of executive interference with legislative independence
by the prosecution of legislators who attempt to influence other
branches of the government in return for alleged bribes is no less
than in a case of a prosecution for promising to perform a "legislative
act" in return for bribes.

There is no substantial increase in the

power of the executive and judicial branches over the legislative
branch resulting from holding that a bribe for a promise is not

-5forbidden by the Constitution.

If this is wrong, Members of Congress

are outside the ambit of federal bribery laws for all purposes bribery
laws are written.
Finally, we should note that the specific danger to legislative
independence that Mr. Justce White perceives in holding a Congressman for bribery may, on second glance, prove less than threatening.

He is concerned that Congressmen may be inhibited in doing

legislative favors for constituents who have made substantial campaign contributions.
spection.

But one man 1 s inhibition is another 1 s circum-

(People do not bribe Members of Congress to shoot one

another, but for other things.)

It should be recalled that legislative

independence, the admitted policy behind the Speech or Debate Clause,
may be threatened far more by corrupt use of financial rewards as
well as by executive or judicial coercion.

Indeed, examples of the

former are numerous and examples of the latter are hard to find.
The wrath of voters is a large deterrent to groundless prosecutions
of legislators.

The dissents engage in what you have called on various occasions
the process of carrying a sound idea beyond the outer limits of its
logic.

It simply cannot be that the Speech or Debate Clause was

intended to cloak Members of Congress with an absolute immunity
for conduct that could lead to the criminal conviction of members of
the Executive branch or of the Judiciary or of the persons who pay
bribes.

The Constitution was not conceived in corruption

-6and independence of legislators does not call for a kind of protection not extended to cabinet officers, judges and other mortals.
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2nd DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
No. 70-45

United States, Appellant,

v.
Daniel B. Brewster.

From :

'l'll~->

ST1t'f~lated:

[May -, 1972]
MR. CHIEF J-csTICE BuRGER delivered the opinion of
the Court.
This direct appeal from the District Court presents
the question whether a Member of Congress may be
prosecuted under 18 U. S. C. ~§ 201 (c) (1) , 201 (g),
for accepting a bribe in exchange for a promise relating to an official act. Appellee, a former United States
Senator, was charged with five counts of a. 10-count
indictment. 1 Co.u nts one, three, five, and seven alleged
that on four separate occasions. appellee, ·while he was
a Senator and a. member of the Senate Committee on
Post Office and Civil Service,
"directly and indirectly, corruptly asked, solicited,
sought, accepted, received and agreed to receive
[sums] . . . in return for being influenced in his
performance of official acts in respect to his action,
vote, and decision on postage rate legislation which
might at any time be pending before him in his
official capacity . . . in violation of Sections 201
(c)(1) and 2, Title 18, United States Code." 2
1
The remaining five counts charged the alleged bribers with offering and giving bribes in violation of 18 U. S. C. § 201 (b) .
2
18 U. S. C. § 2019 (c) (1) provides "Whoe\·er, being a public
official or person selected to be a public official, directly or indirectly
corruptly asks, demands, exacts, solicits, seeks, accepts, receives,
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Count nine charged that appellee
"directly and indirectly, asked, demanded, exacted,
solicited, sought, accepted, received and agreed to
receive [a sum] . . . for and because of official
acts performed by him in respect to his action.
vote and decision on postage rate legislation which
had been pending before him in his officia.l capacity ... in violation of Sections 201 (g) a.nd 2, Title
18, United States Code." 3
Before a trial date was set, the appellee moved to
dismiss the indictment ou the ground of immunity under
the Speech or Debate Clause, Art. I, § 6, of the Constitution, which provides:
"for any Speech or Debate in either House, thPy
[Senators or Representatives l shall not be questioned in any other Place."
After hearing argument. the District Court ruled from
the bench:
"Gentlemen, based on the facts of this case,
it is admitted by the Government that thf' fi \'e
or agree,; to recei1·e anything of value for himself or for any other
per~on or entity, in rrturn for:
"(1) being influenced in his performance of :my offiria.l act .. _
[ ~hall be guilty of an offense]."
18 U. S. C. § 201 (a) dcfinrs "publir ofT-icial" to include "Mrmber
of Congress." The same sub~rclion provides: "'official :tel' mrans
any derision or action on :my quest ion , matter, cause, snit, proceeding
or contro1·ersy, which may nt any tinw br pending or which may by
law be brought bdore any public official, in his ofT-irial capacity, or
in his pla.re of tru. L or profit." 18 U. S. C. § 2 is the aiding
or abetting statute.
3 18 U. S. C. § 201 (g) pro1·icles: ''Whocn~r, being a publir official, former public official, or J1C'r~on selected to be n public offirial,
otherwise than as pro1·iclecl by Llw for the proper discharp;c of
ofT-icial duty, directly or indirectly askR, dcmandR, exact~, solicit s,
serks, accepts, recciYes, or r~grcrs to recei1·e anything of value for
himself for or because •)f any official act performed or to be performed by him . . . [shall be guilty of an offense]."
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3

counts of the indictmcn t which charge Senator
Brewster relate to the acceptance of bribes in connection with the performance of a legislative function by a Senator of the United States.
"It is the opinion of this Court that. the immunity
under the Speech and Debate Clause of the Constitution, particularly in view of t.he interpretation
given that Clause by the Supreme Court in Johnson, shields Senator Bre,vster, constitutionally
shields him from any prosecution for alleged bribery
to perform a legislative act.
"I will, therefore, dismiss the odd counts of the
indictment, 1, 3, 5, 7, and 9, as they apply to Senator Brewster."
The United States filed a direct appeal to this
Court, pursuant to 18 U. S. C. ~ 3731 (Supp. V, 1970) .~
We postponed consideration of jurisdiction until hearing the case on the merits. 401 U. S. 935 (1971).
I

The United States asserts that this Court has jurisdiction under 18 U. S. C. § 3731 (Supp. V. 1970) to
review the District Court's dismissal of the indictment
18 U. S. C. § 3731 (Supp. V, 1970) proYidrs:
"An appeal may be takrn by nne! on behalf of the United States
from the district courts direct to the Snpremr Court of the United
States in nil criminal cas('~ in the following instances:
"From a decision or judgment setting asidr, or dismissing any indictment or information, or any count" thrreof, where such decisions
or judgment is based upon the invalidity or conRI ruction of the statute upon which the indictment or information is founded.
4

"From the drcision or judgment suRt:-~ining a motion in bar, when
the defendant hns not been put in jcop:-~rcly."
The statute has since brcn amended to eliminate the direct appeal provision on which the United Stntes relics. 84 Stat. 1890
(Jan. 2, 1971). This appeal, however, was perfected under the old
statute.

70-45-0PINION
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against appellee. Specifically, the United States urges
tha.t District Court decision >vas either "a decision or
judgment setting aside, or dismissing ran l indictment ...
or any count thereof, where such decision or judgment
is based upon the invalidity or construction of the
statute upon which the indictment ... is founded" or
a "decision or judgment sustaining a motion in bar,
'when the defendant has not been put in jeopardy."·
If the District Court decision is correctly characterized
by either of those descriptions, this Court has jurisdiction under tho statute to hear the United States' appeal.
In United States v. Knox, 396 U. S. 77 ( Hl69), we
considered a direct appeal by the United States from
the dismissal of an indictment that charged the appellee
in that case with violating 18 U. S. C. § 1001, a general
criminal provision punishing fraudulent statements made
to any federal agency. The appellee, Knox, had been
accused of willfully understating the number of employees accepting v,·agcrs on his behalf when he filed
a form which persons engaged in the business of accepting wagers were required by law to file. The District
Court dismissed the counts charging violations of § 1001
'o n the ground that the appellee could not be prosecuted
· for failure to answer the wagering form correctly since
his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination prevented prosecution for failure- to file the form
in any respect. We found jurisdiction under § 3731
to hear the appeal in Knox on the theory that the
District Court had passed on the validity of the statute·
on which the indictment rested. 396 U. S., at 79 n. 2.
The District Court in that case held that "~ 1001, as
applied to this class of cases, is constitutionally invalid."
The counts of the indictment involved in the instant
case were based on 18 U. S. C. § 201, a bribery statute.
Section 201 applies to "public officials," and that term
is defined explicitly to include Members of Congress
as well as other employees and officers of the United

70--45-0PINION
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States. Subsections (c) (1) and (g) prohibit the accepting of a bribe in return for being influenced in orperforming an official act. The ruling of the District
Court here was that "the Speech or Debate Clause of
the Constitution, particularly in view of the interpretation given ... in Johnson shields Senator Brewster ...
from any prosecution for alleged bribery to perform a
legislative act." Since § 201 applies only to bribery for
the performance of official acts, the District Court's
ruling is that, as applied to Members of Congress, § 201
is constitutionally invalid.
Appellee argues that the action of the District Court
was not "a decision or judgment setting aside, or dismissing" the indictment, but was instead a summary
judgment on the merits. Appellee also argues that the
District Court did not rule that § 201 could never be
constitutionally applied to a Congressman, but that
"based on the facts of this case" the statute could not
be constitutionally applied. Under United States v.
Sisson, 399 U. S. 267 ( 1970), an appeal does not lie
from a decision that rests, not upon the sufficiency of
the indictment alone, but upon extraneous facts. If
·an indictment is dismissed as a result of a stipulated
fact or the showing of evidentiary facts outside the
indictment, which facts would constitute a defense on
the merits at trial, no appeal is available. See United
States v. Findley, 439 F. 2c1 970 (CAl 1971). Appellee
claims that the District Court relied on factual matter
other than facts alleged in the indictment.
An examination of the record, however, discloses that,.
with the exception of a letter in which the United States
briefly outlined the theory of its case against appellee,
there were no "facts" on which the District Court could
act other than those recited in the indictment. Appellee,
contends that the statement "based on the facts of this
case," used by the District Judge in announcing his
decision, shows reliance on the Government's outline·

70--45-0PINION
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of its case. We read the District Judge's reference to
"facts," in context, as a reference to the facts alleged
in the indictment and his ruling as holding that Members of Congress arc totally immune from prosecution
for accepting bribes for the performance of official, i e.,
legislative, acts by virtue of the Speech or Debate Clause.
Under that interpretation of § 201, it cannot be applied
to a Member of Congress who accepts bribes that relate
in any way to his office. We conclude, therefore, that
the District Court was relying only on facts alleged
in the indictment and that the dismissal of the indictment was based on a determination that the statute
on which the indictment was drawn was invalid under
the Speech or Debate Clause. As a consequence, this
Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal.
II

The immunities of the Speech or Debate Clause were
not written into the Constitution simply for the personal or private benefit of Members of Congress, but
to pwtect the integrity of the legislative process by
insuring the independence of individual legislators. The
genesis of the Clause at common law is well known.
'In his opinion for the Court. in United Stales v. Johnson,
383 U. S. 169 (1969), Mr. Justice Harlan canvassed
the history of the Clause and concluded that it
"was the culmination of a long struggle for
parliamentary supremacy. Behind these simple
phrases lies a history of conflict bet\\'een the Commons and the Tudor and Stuart monarchs during
which successive monarchs utilized the criminal and
civil law to suppress and intimidate critical legislators. Since the Glorious Revolution in Britain, and
throughout United States history, the privilege has
been recognized as an important protection of the

70-45-0PIKION
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independence and integrity of the legislature."
at 178. (Footnote omitted.)

7

I d.,

Although the Speech or Debate Clause's historic roots
are in English history, it must be interpreted in light of
the American experience and in the context of the
American constitutional scheme of government rather
than the English parliamentary system. The English
system of government differs from ours in that their
Parliament is the supreme authority, and not a coordinate branch. Our speech or debate privilege was
designed to preserve legislative independence, not supremacy." Our task, therefore, is to apply the Clauso
in such a way as to insure the independence of the
legislature " ·ithout elevating it in stature above the
other two co-equal branches of Government.
It docs not undermine the validity of the Framers'
concern for the independence of the legislative branch
to acknowledge that our system of Government has never
produced the sort of executive abuses that gave rise to
the privilege. There is nothing in our history, for example, comparable to the imprisonment of a Member
of Parliament in the Tower without a hearing and,
owing to the subservience of some royal judges to
the Seventeenth a.nd Eighteenth Century English
Kings, without meaningful recourse to a writ of habeas
5 Celln, Thr Doctrine of LegiHiati,·e Pri,·ilrgc of Freedom of Speech
and Debate: Hs Pniit, Presrnt and Future aii a Bar to Criminal
Prosrrutions in thr Court3, 2 Suffolk L. ReY. 1, 15 (1968), Note, The
Bribrd Congre~sman's Immunity from Proserulion, 75 Yale L. J .

335,337-338 (1965) .
In Austrnlia and Cana(h, "where provision for legislati,·e free
sprcch or drbalc exists but wherr the lrgi~lnture may not claim a
tradition as tho highrst rourt of the rralm , courts have hold the
priYiloge does not bar the criminal prosecution of lrgislator::1 for
bribery." !d., at 338.
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corpus. 6 In fact, on only one previous occasion has
this Court ever interpreted the Speech or Debate Clause
in the context of a criminal charge against a Membe1·
of Congress.
(a) In United States v. Johnson, supra, the Court reviewed the conviction of a former Representative on
seven counts of violating the federal conflict of interest
statute, 18 U . S. C. § 281, and on one count of conspiracy to defraud the United States, 18 U . S. C. § 371.
The Court of Appeals had set aside the conviction on
the count for conspiracy to defraud as violating the
Speech or Debate Clause. Mr. Justice Harlan, speaking for the Court, cited. the oft-quoted passage of Mr.
Justice Lush in Ex Parte Wason, 4 Q. B. 573 (1869):
"I am clearly of the opinion that we ought not to
allow it to be doubted for a moment that the motives or intentions of members of either House cannot be inquired into by criminal proceedings with
respect to anything they may do or say in the
House." Id., at 577 (emphasis added).
In Kilbourn Y. Thompson, 103 U. S. 168 (1881), the
first case in which this Court interpreted the Speech
or Debat-e Clause, we adopted a similar statement of
the ambit of the American privilege. There the Court
said the Clause is to be read broadly to include anything "generally done in a session of the House by one
of its members in relation to the business before it."
103 U. S., at 204. This statement, too, was cited with
approval in Johnson, 383 U . S., at 179. Our conclusion in Johnson was that the privilege protected members from inquiry into legislative acts or the motivation
for actual performance of legislative acts. Id., at 185.
0

See C. Wittke, Tho History of English Parliamentary Privilege,
23-32 (1921)
0
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In applying the Speech or Debate Clause, the Court
focused on the specific facts of the Johnson prosecution. The conspiracy to defraud count alleged an
agreement among Representative Johnson and three codefendants to obtain the dismissal of pending indictments against officials of savings and loan institutions.
For these services, which included a speech made by
Johnson on the House floor, Johnson was paid money
which the Government claimed was a bribe. At trial,
the Government questioned Johnson extensively relative
to the conspiracy to defraud count concerning the authorship of the speech, the factual basis for certain
statements made in the speech, and his m.otives for giving·
the speech. The Court held that the use of evidence
of a speech to support a count under a broad conspiracy statute was prohibited by the Speech or Debate
Clause. The Government was, therefore, precluded from
prosecuting the conspiracy count on retrial, insofar as
it depended on inquiries into speeches made in the House.
It is important to note the very narrow scope of the
Court's holding in Johnson:
"We hold that a prosecution under a general criminal statute dependent on such inquiries necessarily
contravenes the Speech or Debate Clause. We emphasize that our holding is limited to prosecutions
involving circumstances such as those presented in
the case before us." 383 U. S., at 184-185.
The opinion specifically left open the question of a
prosecution, which though possibly entailing some reference to legislative acts, is founded upon a "narrowly
drawn" statute passed by Congress in the exercise of
its power to regulate its Member's conduct. Of more
relevance to this case, the Court in Johnson emphasized
that its decision did not affect a prosecution which,
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though founded on a criminal statute of general application, "does not draw in question the legislative acts
of the defendant member of Congress or his motives
for performing them." !d., at 185. The Court did not
question t.he power of the United States to try Johnson
on the conflict of interest counts, and it authorized a
new trial on the conspiracy count, provided that all references to the making of the speech were eliminated. 7
Chief Justice Warren, joined by JL"S'l'ICES Dm.:GLAS
and BRENNAN, concurring in part and dissenting in part
stated:
"After reading the record, it is my conclusion
that the Court of Appeals erred in determining
that the evidence concerning the speech infected
the jury's judgment on the [conflict of interest]
counts. The evidence amply supports the prosecution's throry and the jury's verdict on these countsthat the respondent received over $20,000 for attempting to have the Justice Department dismiss
an indictment against his [present] co-conspirators,
without disclosing his role in the enterprise. This
is the classic example of a violation of ~ 281 b.v a
Member of the Congress. Rec lVf.ay v. United Stoll's,
175 F. 2d 994, 1006 (C.A.D.C. C'ir.); United States
Y. Booth, 148 F. 112, 117 (C'ir. Ct. D. Ore.). The
arguments of government couns('l and the court's
instructions separating the conspiracy from the substantive counts seem unimpeachable. The speech
was a minor pm:t of the prosecution. There ·was
nothing in it to inflame the jury and the rrspondOn remand, the Di~trirt Court dimli R~ cd the ron~piracy count
without objection from the Gon•rnmrnt. Jolm~on was then found
guilty on the rcmnining rount ~ . and his rom·ietion wa s nflirmcd.
United Sta.tes v. Johnson, 419 F. 2d 5G (CA4 1969) , <'Crt. denied,
397 U.S. 1010 (1970).
7
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ent pointed with pride to it as evidence of his
vigilance in protecting the finaucial institutions of
his State. The record further reveals that the
trial participants were well aware that a findiug
of criminality 011 one count did not authorize similar conclusions as to other counts, and I believe
that this salutary principle \\"aS conscientiously follo\\·cd. Therefore, I would affirm the conviction
on the substantive counts." [Footnote omitted.]
Johnson thus stands as a unanimous holding that a
Member of Congress may be prosecuted under a criminal statute provided that the Government's case does 1'\ot
rely on legislative acts or the motivation for legislative
acts. A legislative act has consistently been defined as
an act generally done in Congress in relation to the
business before it. In sum, the Speech or Debate Clause
only prohibits inquiry into those things generally said or
done in the House in the performance of official duties
and the motivation for those acts.
It is well known, of course, that Members of the Congress engage in many activities other than the purely
legislative activities protected by the Speech and Debate Clause. These include a wide range of legitimate "errands" performed for constituents, the making
of appointments with government agencies, assistance in
securing government contracts, preparing so-called "news
letters" to constituents, ne,Ys releases. speeches delivered
outside the Congress. The range of these related activities has grown over the years. They are performed in
part because they have come to be expected by constituents and because they arc a means of developing
continuing support for future elections. Although these
are entirely legitimate activities, they are political in
nature rather than legislative, in the sense that term has
been used by the Court in prior cases. But it has never
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been seriously contended that these political 1natters,
ho,vever appropriate, have the protection afforded by the
Speech or Debate Clause. Careful examination of the
decided cases reveals that the Court has regarded the protection as reaching only those things "generally done in a
session of the House by one of its members in relation
to the business before it," 103 U. S., at 204, or things
"said or done by hi1n as a representative, in the exercise of the functions of that office." 4 Mass., at 27
(quoted with approval in 341 U. S., at 373-374, and
103 U. S., at 203).
(b) Appellee argues, however, that in Johnson we expressed a broader test for the coverage of the Speech or
Debate Clause. It is urged that we held that the Clause
protected from Executive or Judicial inquiry all conduct
"related to the due functioning of the legislative process." It is true that the quoted words appear in the
Johnson opinion, but appellee takes them out of context; in context they reflect a quite different meaning
from that now urged. Although the indictment against
Johnson contained eight counts, only one count was
challenged before this Court as in violation of the Speech
or Debate Clause. The other seven counts concerned
Johnson's attempts to influence members of the Justice
Department to dismiss pending prosecutions. In explaining why those counts were not before the Court,
Mr. Justice Harlan wrote:
"No argument is made, nor do we think that it
could be successfully contended, that the Speech or
Debate Clause reaches conduct, such as was involved in the attempt to influence the Department
of Justice, that i in no wise related to the :due
functioning of the legislative process. It is the
application of this broad conspiracy statute to an
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improperly motivated speech that raises the constitutional problem with which we deal" 383 U. 8.,
at 172. (Emphasis added.)
In stating that those things "in no wise related to
the due functioning of the legislative process" were not
covered by the privilege, the Court did not in any sense
imply that everything that "related" to the office of a
member was shielded by the Clause. Quite the contrary,
in Johnson we held, citing Kilbourn v. Thompson, that
only acts generally done in the course of the process
of enacting legislation were protected.
Nor can we give Kilbourn a more expansive interpretation. In citing with approval the language of
Chief Justice Parsons of the Supreme Judicial Court
of Massachusetts in Coffin v. Coffin, 4 Mass. 1 (1808),
the Kilbourn Court gave no thought to enlarging "legislative acts" to include illicit conduct outside the House.
The Coffin language is:
"[T]he [Massachusetts legislative privilege] ought
not to be construed strictly, but liberally that the
full design of it may be answered. I will not confine it to delivering an opinion, uttering a speech,
or haranguing in debate, but will extend it to the
giving of a vote, to the making of a written report, and to every other act resulting from the
nature and in the execution of the office. And I
would define the article as securing to every mernber exemption from prosecution for everything said
or done by him as a re]Jresentative, in the exercise
of the functions of that office, without enquiring
whether the exercise was regular according to the
rules of the House, or irregular and against their
rules. I do not confine tho member to his place
in the House; and I am sa.tisfied that there are
cases in which he is entitled to this privilege when
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not within the walls of the representatives' chamber." !d., at 27 (emphasis added).

It is suggested that in citing these words, which were
also quoted with approval in Tenney v. Brandhove, 341
U. S. 367, 373-374 (1051), the Court \vas interpreting
the sweep of the Speech or Debate Clause to be broader
than Johnson seemed to indicate or than "·e today hold.
Emphasis is placed on the statement that "there are
cases in which [a member] is entitled to this privilege
when not within the walls of the representatives' chamber." But the context of Coffin v. Coffin indicates that
in this passage Chief Justice Parsons was referring only
to legislative acts, such as committee meetings, which
take place outside the physical confines of the legislative
chamber. In another passage, the meaning is clarified:

"If a member ... be out of the chamber, sitting in
conunittee, executing tho commission of the House,
it appears to me that such member is \vithin the
reason of the article aud ought to be considered
\Yithin tho privilege. The body of which he is a
member is in session, and he, as a member of that
body, is in fact discharging the duties of his office.
Hr ought, therefore, to be protected from civil or
criminal prosecutions for everything said or clonr
by him in the exercise of his functions as a rC'presentativo in committee, either in debating, in assenting to, or in draughting a report." s 4 Mal's.,
at 28.

li'lttis ;;hils t9offiH GXjJIESSGtl ,£ tolti&Iiet fe£ eielstien of
Uu! e·ulos gf *be h~iahn*llt o i!L 01 8 iH no 1ii nt d teln9!? aa
:iP iMmnrity io 1 01 im w lsy Me:: ibu s.
s It is e~prrinll~· important to notr thnt in Coffin v. Coffin , thr rourt·
roncluclrd thnt thr clcfrndant was not rxrruting the dutirs of hi~
office whm he nllrgrclly defamed lhr plaint iff nncl was hence not
rntitlcd to the clnim of priYilegr.
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In no case has this Court ever treated the Clause as
protecting all conduct 1·elating to the legislative process.
In every case thus far before this Court, the Speech
or Debate Clause has been limited to an act which was
clearly a part of the legislative process-the due functioning of the process. • Appellee's contention for a
broaded interpretation of the privilege draws essentially
on the flavor of the rhetoric and the sweep of the language used by courts, not on the precise words Ul'cd in
any prior case, and surely not on the sense of those
cases, fairly read.
(c) We \Yould not think it sound or wise, simply out
of an abundance of caution to doubly insure legislative independence, to extend the privilege beyond its in tended
scope, its literal language, aud its history. to incluclr all
things in any way related to the legislative process.
Given such a sweeping reading, we have no doubt that
there are few activities in which a legislator engages that
he would be unable somehow to "relate" to the legislative process. Admittedly, the Speech or Debate Clause
must be read broadly to effectuate its purpose of protecting the independence of the Legislative branch, but
no more than the statutes we apply, was its purpose to
make Members of Congress super-citizens, immune from
criminal responsibility. In its narrowest scopr, the
See Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U. R. lGR (1RL1) (Yoting for a
'l'eii?U'?f v. Btandehm•e. 341 1i. S. 307 (19:il) (hara~~
mcnt of witnrR ~ b~· s t:~ tc !rgi~lator during n lcgi~JntiYc he:uing; not :1
Speech or Drbntr Cl:nt~e ca~e); United StatPs v. Johnson, 3R3 U. S.
1G9 (19GG) (subpoenaing ncord~ for romittee hearing); Dombrowski
Y . .Eastland, 3R7 U. S. 82 (19()7) (~nbpornning rrcord~ for !'Ornmittee hearing); Pou·ell v. McCormack , 395 U.S. 48G (19G9) (votingfor a resolution) .
In Coffin Y. Coffin, 4 l\f~tss . 1 (lROS) , 1hr stnte equindent of the
Speech or Debate' Clause wn~ hrlcl to be inapplicnhle to a legislator
who was acting outsiclr of hi~ officinl clut ies.
0

rr~olutioll);
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Clause is a very large, albeit essential, grant of privilege.
It has enabled reckless men to slander and even destroy
others 'vith impunity, but that was conscious choice of
the Framers awl t 1 •1 i its hishnie nun jt bs s : ert+
3

as teell.lo
The history of legislative privilege is by no means
free from grave abuses by legislators. In one instance,
abuses reached such a level in England that Parliament
\\"aS compelled to enact curative legislation.
"The practice of granting the privilege of freC'dom
from arrest and molestation to members' servants
in time became a serious menace to individual liberty and to public order, and a form of protection
by which offenders often tried- and they were often
successful-to escape the penalties which their offenses deserved, and ·which the ordinary courts would
not have hesitated to inflict. Indeed the sale of
'protections' at one time proved a source of income
to unscrupulous members and· those 'parliamentary
indulgences' \vere on several occasions obtainable
at a fixed market price." C. Wittke, The History
of English Parliamentary Privilege, 39 (1921).
The authors of our Constitution were well aware of
the history of both the need for the privilege and the
abuses that could flow from too sweeping safeguards.
In order to preserve other values, they wrote the privilege so that it tolerates and protects behavior on the
10 "To this construction of the tu ticle it is objected, that a pri,·ate
citizen may have hi ~ charader ba ~e ly defamed, without any pecuniary
recompense or sat isfaction. Thr truth of the objection is admitted. . . . The injury to the re]1utation of a pri,·atc citizen is
of less importance to the commonwralth, than the free and unreserved exercise of the duties of n reprr~entati,·e , unawed by fear
of legal prosecutions." Coffin v. Coffin, 4 Mass. 1, 32 (1808).
Sec Cochran v. Couzens, 42 F. 2d 783 (CADC), cert. denied, 282
U. S. 874 (1930) (defmnatory words uttered on Senate floor could
not be basis of slander action).
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part of Members not tolerated and protected when done·
by other citizens, but the shield does not extend beyond
what is necessary to preserve the integrity of the legislative process.
Moreover, unlike England vvith no·
formal, written constitutional limitations on the monarch, we defined limits on each branch and provided
other checks to protect against abuses of the kind experienced in that country.
It is also suggested that even if we interpreted the
Clause broadly so as to exempt from inquiry all matters
having any relationship to the legislative process, misconduct of Members would not necessarily go unpunished
because each House is empowered to discipline its Members. Article I, § 5, does indeed empower each House to
"determine the rules of its Proceedings, pu11ish its Members for disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of
two thirds, expel a Member," but Congress is ill-equipped
to investigate, try, and punish its Members for a wide
range of behavior that is lQosely and incidentally related
to tho legislative process. 11 Indeed, Congress has shov,·n
little inclination in this area. 12 Moreover, if Congress
11 In this sense the English analogy is inapt.
Parliament is itself
"The High Court of Par1Jam0nt "-the high0st court in the landnnd its judicial tradition better equips it for judicial tasks. "It is
by no means an exaggeration to say that [the judicial characteristics
of Parliament] colored and influenced some of the great struggles
over lqd ~ lat ive privilege in and out of Parliament to the very close
of the nineteenth century. It is not altogether certain whether they
h:we bern entirely forgotten even now. Nowhere has the theory that
Parliamrnt is a court-the highest court of the realm, often acting
in a judicial capacity and iu a judicial manner-persisted longer than
in the history of privilege of Parliament." C. Wittke, The History
of English Parliamentary Privilege, 14 (1921).
12
Sec Thomas, Freedom of Debate: Protector of the People or
Haven for the Criminal'?, 3 Han·. L. Hr,·. 77, SO-tG (::-io. :~ , 10(i5);
Note, TIJc Bribed Congressmnn's Imunity from Prosecution, 75
Yale L. J. 3:35, 349 n. 84 (1965); Oppenhrim, Congressional Free·
Speech, 8 Loyola L. Hev. 1, 27-28 (1955-1956).
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did lay aside its normal activities and take on itself
the responsibility to police the myriad activities of its
Members related to but not directly a part of the legislative function, the independence of individual Members
might actually be impaired.
The process of disciplining a Member in the Congress is not without countervailing risks of abuse since
it is not surrounded with the panoply of protective
shields that are present in a criminal case. An
accused Member is judged by no specifically articulated
standards 1 3 and is at the mercy of an almost unbridled discretion of the charging body that functions
at once as accuser, prosecutor, judge, and jury from
whose decision there is no established right of review.
It would be somewhat naive to assume that the triers
would be wholly objective and free from considerations
of party and politics and the passions of the moment. 14
Strong arguments can be made that trials conducted
in a Congress with an entrenched majority from one
political party could result in far greater harassment
than a conventiollal criminal trial with the wide range
of procedural protections for the accused, including indictment by grand jury, trial by jury under strict standards of proof with fixed rules of evidence. and extensive
appellate review.
Finally, the jurisdiction of Congress to punish its
Members is not all-embracing. For instance. it is unclear to what extent Congress would have jurisdiction
over a case such as this in which the alleged illegal
activity occurred outside the chamber, while the appellC'e
'" f'rP. e.(!., In re Chapman. 106 F. 8. 661, GG9-fi70 (l~!.Ji):
"The right to expel extend~ to all cases wlwre the offense:' is such
as in the judgment of the Senate is imon~i~tcnt with the trust and
duly of a member."
14
Sec the arrount of the impeachment of PrP-<idrnt Audrf'w
.Johnson in J. Kennedy, Profiles in Courage, 126-151 (1956).
1

"

"Engli.~h

Parliaments h::l\-e historically

re~e n·rd

to thrm,<·h·e/3-
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was a :Member, but was undiscovered or not brought
before a grand jury until after he left office.~ ~·
The sweeping claims of appellee would render Members of Congress virtually immune from a wide range
of crimes simply because the acts in question were
peripherally related to their office. Such claims arc inconsistent with the reading this Court has given, not
only to the Speech or Debate Clause, but also to the
other legislative privileges embodied in Art. I, § 6. The
same sentence in which the Speech or Debate Clause
appears provides that Members "shall in all Cases, except Treason, Felony and Breach of the Peace, be privileged from Arrest during their attendance at the Session
of their Perspective Houses. . . ." In Williamson v.
United States, 207 U.S. 425 (1908), this Court rejected
a claim, made by a Member convicted of subornation of
perjury in proceedings for the purchase of public lands,
that he could not be arrested, convicted or imprisoned
for any crime that was not treason, felony, or breach
of the peace in the modern sense, i. e., disturbing the
peace. Mr. Justice White, writing for the Court, in
the 1007 Term, noted that in the 18th Century the term
"Breach of the Peace" referred to breaching the King's
peace and thus embraced the whole ranp:c of crimes at
common law. Quoting Lord Mansfield's remarks in
King Y. Wilkes, 2 Wils. 151, he noted, with respect to
the claim of parliamentary privilege, "The la\YS of this
country allow no place or employment as a sanctuary
for crime .... " I d., at 439.
and still retain thr sole and exclu~ivc right to punish their member:>
for the acceptance of a bribe in the discharge of their office. No
member of Pn.rlinmcnt mn.y be trird for such an offense in any court
of the land." Cella, The Doctrine of Legi~lative PriYilege of Freedom of Sperch and Debntc: Its Past , Pre~ent and Future us a Bar
to Criminal ProsecutionH in the Courts , 2 Suffolk L. Rev. 1, 14-15
(1908). That this is obviously not the case in this country is implicit in the remand of Representative .Johu~oll to be retried ou
bribery charges.

70-45-0PINION
20

UNITED STATES v. BREWSTER

The subsequent case of Long v. Ansell, 293 U. S. 76
( 1934), held that a Member's immunity from arrest
in civil cases did not extend to civil process. Mr. Justice Brandeis wrote for the Court:
"Clause 1 [of Article I, § 6] defines the extent of
the immunity. Its language is exact and leaves no
room for construction which would extend the privilege beyond the terms of the grant." I d., at 82.
We recognize that the privilege against arrest is not
identical with the Speech or Debate privilege, but it
is closely related in purpose and origin. It can hardly
be thought that the Speech or Debate Clause protects
what the sentence preceding it has plainly left open to
prosecution, i. e., all criminal acts.
(d) It, is, nevertheless, asserted that permitting the
Executive to initiate the prosecution of a Member of Congress for the specific crime of bribery is subject to serious
potential abuse that might endanger the independence
of the legislatiure-for example, a campaign contribution
might be twisted by a ruthless prosecutor into a bribery
indictment. But, as we have just noted, the Executive
is not alone in possessing power potentially subject to
abuse; such possibilities are inherent in a system of
government which delegates to each of the three branches
separate and independent powers. 10 In the Federalist
16 The potential for hara ssment by an unscrupulous member of
the Executive Branch may exi~t, but this country has no tradition
of absolute congressional immunity from criminal prosecution. See
United States v. Quinn, 141 F. Supp. 622 (SDNY 1956) (motion for
acquittal granted because the defendant Member of Congress was
unaware of receipt of fees by his law finn); Burton v. United States,.
202 U. S. 344 (1906) (Semtor convicted for accepting compensation
to intervene before Post Office Department); United States v. Dietrich, 126 F. 676 (CCD Neh. 1904) (Senator-elect's accepting payment to procure office for another not covered by statute); May v.
United States, 175 F. 2d 994 (CADC 1949) (Congressman convicted
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No. 73, Hamilton expressed concern over the possible·
hazards that confronted an Executive dependent on Congress for financial support.
"The legislature, with a discretionary power over
the salary and emoluments of the chief magistrate,
could render him as obsequious to their will as
they might think proper to make him. They might,
in most cases, either reduce him by famine, or
tempt him by largesses, to surrender at discretion,
his judgment to their inclinations."
Yet Hamilton's "parade of horribles" finds little real
support in history. The check-and-balance mechanism,
buttressed by unfettered debate in an open society with
a free press has not encouraged abuses of power or tolerated them long when they arose. This may be explained
of receiving compensation for services before an agency); United·
States v. Bramblett, 348 U. S. 503 (1955) (Congressman convicted
of defrauding government agency). Bmmblett concerned a Congrcssmnn's misuse of office funds via a "kick-back" scheme, which
is surely "related" to the legislative offire.
A strategically timed indictment could indeed cause serious harm
to a Congressman. Representative Johnson, for example, was indicted while campaigning for re-election, and arguably his indictment contributed to his defeat. On the other hand, there is the
classic case of Mayor Curley who was re-elected while under indictment. Sec 4 New Catholic Encyclopedia, at 541 (1967). Moreover, we should not overlook the barriers a prosecutor, attempting
to bring such a case, mu."t face. First, he must persuade a grand
jury to indict, and we arc not prepared to assume i.hat grnnd juries
will act against a Member without solid evidence. Thereafter, he
must convince a petit jury beyond a reasonable doubt with the presumption of innocence favoring the accused. A prosecutor who fails
to clear one of these hurdles fares serious practical consequences
when the defendant is a Congressman. The Legislative Branch is
not without weapons of its own and would no doubt use them if it
thought the ExccutiYc were unjustly harnssing one of its members ..
Perhaps more imJiOr!ant is the omnipresence of the news media
whose traditional function and competitive inclination affords no .
immunities to reckless or irresponsible official misconduct.
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in part because the third branch has intervened with
neutral authority. See, e. g., United States v. Lovett,
328 U.S. 303 (1946). The system of divided powers was
expressly designed to check the abuses England experienced in the 16th to the 18th century.
Probably of more importance is the public opposition
engendered by any attempt of one branch to dominate
or harass another. Even lawful political attempts to
establish dominance have met with little success owing
to contrary popular sentiment. Attempts to "purge"
uncooperative legislators, for example, have not been
notably successful. We are not cited to any cases
in which the bribery statutes, which have been applicable to Members of Cougress for over 100 years, 17
have been abused by the Executive Branch. When a
powerful Executive sought to make the Judicial Branch
more responsive to the combined will of the Executive
and Legislative Branches, it "·as the Congress itself that
checked the effort to enlarge the Court. 2 M. Pusey,
Charles Evans Hughes, c. 70 (1951).
Io!t Joleasun, Mi6 eom c ;;pecifieally lu"l18 n~lit impi11iilil
ir&t8 " Oengtcssman's ccUll!taph to idhm11ec m:otlter
l!stt'IIBelt of the e:tocmmmllt ::eiS not ptoltilsihrl lir tM.~t
ipi!I!!!S ill ];lghete Qlanse. We would be closing our
eyes to the realities of the American political system if ~/M'n- tJn •. :Ad~
we failed to acknowledge that ~;(a'ctivities arc an ·
(J
~ •
established and acce]1tecl part of the role of a Member,
and are indeed "related" to the legislative process. If
the Executive may prosecute a Member's attempt as in
.!ohnson, to influence another branch of the Government
in return for a bribe, its power to harass is not greatly
enhanced if it can prosecute for a promise relating to a
legislative act in return for a bribe. We therefore sec no
The firsL bribery ~tatutr npplicablc to Congressmrn was enacted
in 1853. Act of Feb. 2G, 1853, c. 81, § 6, 10 Stat. 171.
17
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substantial increase in the power of tho Executive and
Judicial Branches over tho Legislative Branch resulting
from our holding today. If we underestimate the potential for harassment, the Congress, of course, is free
to exempt its Members from the ambit of federal bribery
laws, but it has deliberately allowed the instant statute
to remain on tho books for over a century.
We do not discount on tirely the possibility that
an abuse might occur, but this possibility which '"e
consider remote, must be balanced against the potential danger flowing from either the absence of a
bribery statuto applicable to Members of Congrcf's or
a holding that tho statuto violates the Constitution.
As ,,.e noted at the outset, the purpose of the Speech
or Dcba.tc Clause is to protect the in eli vidual legislator,
not. simply for his O\Vn sake, but to prcf'erve the independence and thereby tho integrity of the legislative
process. But financial abuses, by way of bribes, as well
as Executive power, can undermine legislative integrity
and defeat the right of the public to honest representation.18 Depriving the Executive of the power to investigate and prosecute and tho Judiciary of the power to
. ~
punish bribery of Members of Congress is unlikely to Moo ...f2/orl~ ~
Mlt in & 1 ot ia u oa:sc of indepemleiiC lcglslcttbl s :: ho eleeiek
~.
M:tes ,,u tb · ni11e; atltet tlm11 fm p~. Given the disinclination and disability of each House to police these
matters, it is understandable that both Houses deliberately delegated this function to tho courts, as they did
with the power to punish persons committing contempts
of Congress. 2 U. S. C. ~ 192 .
.-~'EM ..,._,.) ~g,r
Wo tlmefm e oo1 ohuio that tho Speech or Debate
- ~rw ·
Clause protects against inquiry into acts which occur
"Your rcprcsrntativr owes you, not hi~ induRtry only, but his
judgment; and he brtrays in~tead of srrving you if he sacrifices it
1o your opinion." Speerh of Edmund Burke to the Electors of
Bri tol, No\·. 3, 1774.
18
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in the regular course of the legislative process and into
the motivation for those acts. So expressed, the privilege is broad enough to insure the historic independence
of the Legislative Branch, so essential to our separation
of powers, but narrow enough to guard against the
excesses of those who would corrupt the process by
corrupting its Members. We t.urn 11ext to determine
whether the subject of this criminal inquiry is \Vithin
the scope of the privilege.

III
An examination of the indictment brought against
appellee and the statutes on which it is founded reveals that no inquiry into legislative acts or moti\'ation
for legislative acts is necessary for the Government to·
make out a prima facie case. Four of the five counts
charge that appellee "corruptly asked, solicited, sought,
accepted, received, and agreed to receive" money "in
return for being influenced ... in respect to his action,
vote, and decision on postage rate legislation, which
might at any time be pending before him in his official
capacity." This is said to be a violation of 18 U. S. C.
§ 201 (c) ( 1), which provides that a Member who "corruptly a....'\ks, demands, exacts, solicits, seeks, accepts, receives, or agrees to receive anything of value . . . in
return for . . . being influenced in his performance of
any official act" is guilty of an offense.
The question is whether it is necessary to inquire into
how appellee spoke, how he debated, how he voted, or
anything he did in the chamber or in committee in order
to make out a violation of this statute. The illegal conduct is taking or agreeing to take money for a promise
to act in a certain way. There is no need for the Government to show that appellee fulfilled the alleged illegal
bargain; acceptance of the bribe is the violation of the
statute, not performance of the illegal promise.
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Taking a bribe is, obviously, not part of the legislative process or function; it is not a legislative act. Nor
is inquiry into a legislative act or the motivation for a
legislative act necessary to a prosecution under this
statute or this indictment. When a bribe is taken, it
does not matter whether the promise for which the
bribe was given was for the performance of a legislative act or, as in Johnson, for use of a Congressman's
influence with the Executive Branch. Nor does it matter if the Member defaults on his illegal bargain. To
make a prima facie case under this indictment, the Government need not show any act of appellee subsequent
to the corrupt promise for payment for it is taking the·
bribe, not performance of the illicit compact, that is a
criminal act. If, for example, there were undisputed evidence that a Member took a bribe in exchange for an
agreement to vote for a given bill and if there were also
undisputed evidence that he, in fact, voted against the
bill, can it be thought that this alters the nature of the
bribery or removes it from the area of wrongdoing the
Congress sought to make a crime? We think not.
Another count of the indictment against appellee alleges that he "asked, demanded, exacted, solicited,
sought, accepted, received, and agreed to receive" money
"for and because of official acts performed by him in
respect to his action, vote, and decision on postage rate
legislation which had been pending before him in his
official capacity." This count is founded on 18 U. S. C.
§ 201 (g), which provides that a Member of Congress
who "asks, demands, exacts, solicits, seeks, accepts, receives, or agrees to receive anything of value for himself or because of any official act performed or to be
performed by him" is guilty of an offense. Although
the indictment alleges actual performanre of an official
act for which a bribe is given, .it is once again unnecessary to inquire into the act or its motivation. To.
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sustain a conviction it is necessary to show that appellee
solicited, received, or agreed to receive, money with
knowledge that the donor was paying him compensation for an official act. Inquiry into t.hc legislative performance itself is not necessary; evidence of the Member's knowledge of the alleged briber's illict reasons for
paying the money is sufficient to carry the case to the
JUry.

It is asserted, however, that inquiry into the alleged
bribe is inquiry into the motivation for a legislative act,
and it is urged that this very inquiry " ·as condemned as
impermissible in Johnson. That argument seems to us
to misconstrue the concept of motivation for legislative
acts. The Speech or Debate Clause does not prohibit
inquiry into illegal conduct simply because it has some
nexus to legislative functions. In Johnson, ''"e indicated
that on remand, Johnson could be retried on the conspiracy to d(•fraud count-all relating to conduct outside the House-so long as evidence concerning his speech
on the House floor was not admitted. The Court's
·opinion plainly implies that had the Government chosen
to retry Johnson on that count, he could not have obtained immunity from prosecution by asserting that the
matter being inquired into was related to the motivation for his House speech.
The only reasonable reading of the Clause, consistent
with its history and purpose, is that it docs not prohibit inquiry into activities which are casually or acciclen tally related to legislative affairs but not a part of
the legislative process itself, so long as there is no attempt to prove a link with a legislative act. Under
this indictment and these statutes no such proof is
needed. 19
10
In rrvrr~ing the Di~trict Court':-; ruling that a 1\lcmbrr of Congrrss may not be con~titutionall~· trird for a Yiolation of the federal
bribery statutes, we exprrss no Yirw~ on the qurstion left oprn in

70-45-0PINION
UNITED STATES v. BREWSTER

27

We hold that under this statute and this indictment,
prosecution of appellee is not prohibited by the Speech
or Debate Clause. Accordingly the judgment of the
District Court is reversed and the case is remanded for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Johnson as to the constitutionality of an inquiry that probes into

ll'gislative acts or the motivation for legislative acts if Congress
specifically authorizes such in a narrowly drawn statute. Should
such an inqury be made and should a conviction be sustained, then
we would face the question whether inquiry into legislative acts and
motivation is permissible under such a narrowly drawn statute.
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